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PEREMPTORY

We have a criminaljury system which is superior to any in the world;
and its efficiency is only marredby the difficulty offinding twelve men
every day who don 't know anything and can 't read.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jury service is one of the most significant ways in which an
individual can directly participate in the administration of justice and
influence the adjudicative process.2 Yet the right of a prospective juror
to be free from discrimination in her participation in jury service is put
at risk by a litigant's unfettered discretion in the use of the peremptory
challenge.' In order to safeguard a potential juror's equal protection
guarantee against discriminatory exclusion from jury service, the United
States Supreme Court, in Batson v. Kentucky4 and its progeny, imposed
significant restrictions on the way in which litigants exercise peremptory
challenges. Litigants may not base peremptory challenges on the race,5
ethnicity,6 or gender of a prospective juror.
The Supreme Court's limitations on the way in which litigants
utilize peremptory challenges demonstrates the superiority of a prospective juror's constitutional rights over the litigant's privilege to exercise
peremptory challenges.' Although Batson and the Supreme Court cases
following and expanding Batson address only those peremptory
challenges infringing upon a juror's equal protection rights involving

1. MARK TWAIN, Fourth of July Speech in London, in COLLECTED TALES, SKETCHES,
SPEECHES, & ESSAYS 1852-1890, at 556, 556 (1992).
2. "The jury is the part of the nation responsible for the execution of the laws [and] for
society to be governed in a settled and uniform manner, it is essential that the jury lists should
expand or shrink with the lists of voters." ALEXS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 251
(J.P. Mayer & Max Lemer eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966).
3. See infra part II.B.
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. See id. at 89.
6. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the Court considered a claim that "the
prosecutor in [a] criminal trial exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos from the jury by
reason of their ethnicity." Id. at 355. Although the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that
the prosecutor did not eliminate Latino jurors on the basis of their ethnicity, id. at 369, had the
defendant established ethnicity as the prosecutor's underlying motivation, the peremptory challenge
would have violated the juror's equal protection rights.
7. J.E.B. v. Alabama exreL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994).
8. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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race,9 ethnicity, ° and gender," the Court's language and underlying
rationale support an expansion of Batson beyond these contexts.
The breadth of the doctrine created by Batson and its progeny
(hereinafter referred to as the "Batson Doctrine") can be understood to
include a juror's exercise of First Amendment association and speech
rights as well. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discriminatory
treatment based not only upon membership in a cognizable group but
also upon an individual's exercise of a fundamental right. The rights to
associate and speak freely are fundamental rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment. A litigant's peremptory exclusion of a potential juror from
service on the basis of either the juror's group affiliations or expressions
of speech directly conflicts with the potential juror's First Amendment
rights. There is a paucity of lower court opinions or commentary
addressing Batson's application to prospective jurors' association and
speech rights, and the few lower courts that have discussed the issue
have afforded it only superficial consideration. 2 An expansion of
Batson is, however, supported by the broad language, doctrinal framework, and rationale underlying the Batson Doctrine, and by the importance of safeguarding First Amendment rights.
This Article examines the conflict between the litigant's peremptory
challenge privilege and the First Amendment rights of a prospective
juror, and argues for resolving the conflict in favor of the juror's
constitutionally protected rights. The peremptory challenge is merely an
accommodation of the litigant's desire to exert greater control over the
adjudicative process. As a mere strategic device, the peremptory
challenge is not afforded constitutional protection, is subject to various
restrictions, and is not essential to achieve a fair and unbiased jury. In
addition, litigants utilizing peremptory challenges rely upon, and thereby
perpetuate, harmful stereotypes.
Part II of this Article provides background on the roles of the juror
and the peremptory challenge in the United States judicial system, and
sets forth the Supreme Court's current restrictions on a litigant's exercise
of peremptory challenges. Building upon this backdrop, Part I examines
more critically the purpose, status, and common usage of the peremptory
challenge, and places in perspective this limited privilege. Part IV
explores the potential impact of the peremptory challenge upon a

9. See infra notes 59-90 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 6.

11. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
12. See infra part IV.E.
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prospective juror's First Amendment rights and concludes that a
prospective juror's exclusion from jury service as a consequence of
affiliations or expressions, which do not warrant removal of the juror for
cause, constitutes discrimination against the prospective juror in the
exercise of a fundamental right. Based upon this conclusion, this Article
advocates extending the Batson Doctrine to peremptory challenges that
are based upon a prospective juror's association and speech rights. 3
II.

THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE PRIVILEGE V.
JUROR'S RIGHTS

A.

A PROSPECTIVE

The Conflict

A call to jury service empowers the individual juror by allowing
meaningful participation in our judicial system. 4 A citizen serving as
a juror simultaneously exercises a right and a privilege to serve and
fulfills a civic obligation. 5 Jury selection practices have a great effect
on the juror's ability to exercise her rights and privileges and fulfill her

13. The Supreme Court has not yet expanded Batson to protect constitutional rights of a
potential juror beyond the equal protection right against racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination. The
Court has denied certiorari in one case involving religious-based peremptory challenges. See Davis
v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari were Justices Thomas
and Scalia).
14. "'The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection of the people by their
representatives in the legislature... have procured for them, in this country, their true proportion
of influence, and the wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves in the community."' Vikram
D. Amar, Jury Service as Political ParticipationAkin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 220
(1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Letterfrom the Federal Farmer (1k), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 249-50 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981)). In Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991), the Court recognized that "with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor
and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process." Id. at 407; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) ("[P]articipat~ion]
in the fair administration of justice ... reaffirms the promise of equality under the law--that all
citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our
democracy." (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 407)).
15. "'Thejury system postulates a conscious duty of participation in the machinery ofjustice."'
Powers,499 U.S. at406 (emphasis added) (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,310 (1922));
see J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424 ("'The diverse and representative character of the jury must be
maintained "partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility."" (emphasis added) (quoting Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)))); JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION:

THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY § 6.02 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that citizens
have a right to be considered for jury service and an obligation to serve as jurors (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861)).
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obligation. In addition to its impact on the potential jurors, the jury
selection process is significant to the litigants whose fate the jurors will
decide. It is widely believed that jury composition greatly affects the
outcome of a case.
The jury trial is fundamental to our nation's system of justice. 16 It
is the mechanism to which society turns in order to resolve disputes of
the utmost importance. For example, criminal defendants are guaranteed
the right to a trial by jury. 7 In criminal prosecutions, the jury is the
arbiter of the defendant's guilt, 8 and in capital cases, may even be
called upon to determine whether a defendant will be put to death. 9
Additionally, a vast number of civil lawsuits either culminate in a jury
trial or settle at the prospect of one.2" In civil disputes, jurors have the
power to decide crucial questions, such as allocation and degree of
fault2' and the nature and amount of any compensatory or punitive
damage awards.22 To the citizens who are afforded an opportunity to
render a judgment on these weighty matters, and to the litigants whose
interests will then be affected, jury selection methodology is significant.
Accordingly, a conflict exists between the litigant's interest in the
unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges and the juror's right to be
free of discrimination in the jury selection process.

16. "'[I]t is true, the laws are made by the legislature; but the judges and juries, in their
interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a very extensive influence... for
changing the nature of the government."' Amar, supra note 14, at 219 (alteration in original)
(quoting Letterfrom the FederalFarmer(XA9, reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315,
315 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981)).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. See id.; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of due
process of law).
19. See 2 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 23.01 (Elissa
Krauss & Beth Bonora eds., 2d ed. 1993).
20. In the United States, approximately 20 million civil cases are filed per year, with more than
90% of all tort claims being settled out of court. See Rod Willis, Fit To Be Tied, WORLD, No. 1,
1993, at 30, 33, 39.
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also 2 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 19,
§ 19.01(2)(a).
22. A party may be entitled to compensation for some of the following: out-of-pocket
expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering, or emotional distress. See 2 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT,
supra note 19, § 19.01(2)(b)(ii). Furthermore, jurors may be asked to award punitive damages--additional monetary compensation to punish or make an example of the defendant. See 2 id.
§ 19.01(2)(b)(iii).
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B.

The History and Nature of the Peremptory Challenge

Citizens2 3 throughout the United States and its territories are called
to jury duty and are randomly selected by the summoning court to
undergo the jury selection process for a particular case.24 Not all
citizens, however, are qualified to sit on every jury. As part of the jury
selection process,2 5 known as voir dire,2 6 the presiding judge27 or

23. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (explaining that conditioning jury
service upon citizenship does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). Citizenship requirements for
jurors have withstood constitutional challenges. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 15, § 6.04.
Federal and state statutes also require citizenship among the criteria for qualification for jury
service. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 53, 58
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1994)); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a)(1) (West
1996); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(1) (MeKinney 1996); 3 ABA STANDING COMM. ON ASS'N STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 15-2.1(c) (2d ed. Supp. 1986)
[hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994) (stating that jurors are to be "selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community"); N.Y. JUn. LAW § 506 (MeKinney 1996) ("The commissioner of
jurors shall cause the names of prospective jurors to be selected at random...."); 3 ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 23, No. 15-2.1(a).
25. For a general discussion of various jury selection procedures, see JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977). However, there are several features that are common to many jury
selection procedures. See INATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supranote 19, § 5.02. These features include:
the use of a particular source to obtain the names of potential jurors; the random selection of names
from the source list; the screening of potential jurors in a qualification process that results in a list
of individuals qualified for jury service, which may be referred to as the "qualified wheel," 'Jury
pool," "qualified pool," or "pool"; and, the selection of names from the qualified list and summoning
of jurors for jury service. See 1 id. Alternatively, in some jurisdictions a jury commissioner or
commission prepares the jury list and administers the qualification criteria. See 1 id.
Additionally, there are jurisdictional variations in the methods employed to handle challenges
for cause and peremptory strikes. For a discussion of the various systems, see CATHY E. BENNETT
& ROBERT B. HIRSCHORN, BENNETT'S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN Cin
AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION §§ 17.2-.5 (Eda Gordon ed., 1993).
26. The literal meaning of "voir dire" is "to speak the truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575
(6th ed. 1990). The term is used to denote the preliminary examination which the court or attorneys
may make of one presented as a potential juror or witness to determine his interest and
competency. Id.
27. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure both
afford federal judges complete discretion as to whether to conduct the examination themselves or
to permit the attorneys to conduct the voir dire. ABA COMMITTEE ON JURY STANDARDS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT No. 7 commentary at 62 (1993) [hereinafter ABA
JUROR STANDARDS] (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)). Generally, most federal judges conduct voir dire
themselves. Id. (citing GORDON BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION: PRACTICES
AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 5 (1977)); GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 15, § 9.05.
The ABA JurorStandards themselves, adopted by at least 12 states, provide that the trial judge
should conduct a preliminary voir dire examination, with counsel afforded a reasonable time period
to question jurors. ABA JUROR STANDARDS, supra, No. 7(b).
State rules or statutes may specifically provide that the judge shall examine prospective
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counsel28 poses questions to the prospective jurors to determine whether
the jurors are qualified to sit fairly and impartially on that case.29 A
juror's fitness to serve on a particular case may be compromised due to
the juror's bias,30 prior experiences,3 1 relationship to the case32 or the
involved parties,33 or to some similar factor that interferes with the
juror's ability to adjudicate the matter fairly and impartially.3 4
Because the presence of a biased or unqualified juror undermines
the integrity of the trial process," a litigant may challenge "for cause"

any juror who the litigant believes is not qualified to fulfill her obligation
to serve as a fair and impartial juror.3 6 The challenge for cause is the
mechanism employed by the court to eliminate individuals whose bias,
of whatever type, renders them incapable of serving as fair jurors. The
court affords the litigant an unlimited number of challenges for cause.37
A litigant who moves the court to exclude the juror from service must
establish the juror's lack of fitness.38 The trial judge then determines

jurors. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West 1996); MASS. P- Civ. P. 47(a). Trial judges
in 13 states conduct voir dire themselves, while attorneys in 18 states have primary control over voir
dire questioning. ABA JUROR STANDARDS, supra, No. 7 commentary at 62 (citing NATIONAL CTIL
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1987, at tbl. 24 (1988)).

28. See ABA JUROR STANDARDS, supra note 27, No. 7 commentary at 62; see also CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 222.5 (West 1996); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15(c) (McKinney 1993).
29. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
30. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 229(f) (West 1996).
31. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 15, § 7.12.
32. See id. § 7.16 (discussing disqualification of jurors due to prior knowledge of the facts);
see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229(d) (West 1996) (disqualifying due to interest in the event or
"in the main question involved in the action").
33. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 229(a), (b) (West 1996); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4110(b)
(McKinney 1993); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(c) (McKinney 1993); GOBERT & JORDAN, supra
note 15, §§ 7.21-.23, 7.25-.31.
34. For a listing of the most common grounds for challenges for cause, see GOBERT &
JORDAN, supra note 15, § 7.04.
35. The Supreme Court has held that the right to a "fair trial in a fair tribunal" is essential to
due process. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Furthermore, the Court noted that "to
perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."' Id.
(quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)); see also V. HALE STARR & MARK
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY LAW AND METHODS § 3.8.2 (2d
ed. 1993).
36. For a discussion of the requirement of juror impartiality, see GOBERT & JORDAN, supra
note 15, §§ 2.09-.12. For an overview on the development of the challenge for cause, see id.
§§ 7.01-.05.
37. Id. § 7.01.
38. See David Hittner & Eric J.R. Nichols, Jury Selection in FederalCivil Litigation:General
Procedures,New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 TEx. TECH L. REv. 407, 440-46 (1992).
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whether cause exists for the juror's removal.39 If the court agrees that
the juror
is unfit, the court will excuse the juror from service on the
0
case.

4

Virtually all jurisdictions also grant litigants the right to exclude a
limited number of jurors without first establishing cause for a juror's
removal. 4 ' These discretionary strikes are known as peremptory
challenges or peremptory strikes.4' The peremptory challenge was

incorporated into the American legal system from its English law

roots, 43 and was later codified as part of our federal system in 1790.4
As a result of codification, federal prosecutors and defendants were each
afforded a defined number of challenges, depending upon the nature of
the offense, 5 which they were permitted to exercise without legal cause.
The peremptory challenge privilege was also codified into many state
statutes.46 In England, the peremptory challenge is rarely used.47 In
contrast, the peremptory challenge remains well-entrenched in this
nation's jury selection process.48
By definition, peremptory challenges are employed against potential

39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & IL 4108 (McKinney 1993); MASs.
R. CIuM. P. 20(b)(3); GOBERT & JoRDAN, supra note 15, § 7.05.
40. See supra note 39.
41. In federal court, a party in a civil case ordinarily has three peremptory challenges. 28
U.S.C. § 1870 (1994). The number of peremptory challenges available in a criminal case varies
depending on the potential punishment. See FED. IL CRiM. P. 24(b). The same is true in every state,
where peremptory challenges or strikes are given by statute to both sides in criminal and civil cases.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217 & n.20 (1965).
42. The terms "challenge" and "strike" are used interchangeably in this Article.
43. In Swain, Justice white described the early use of the peremptory challenge in England:
At common law, the defendant was allowed 35 peremptory challenges in all felony trials. 380 U.S.
at 212. Originally, the prosecutor had a right to challenge an unlimited number of jurors without
cause. See id. at 213. Later, the prosecution was allowed, after examination, to have any juror "stand
aside" until the entire panel was examined and the defendant exercised his challenges. Id. At this
point, if there was a deficient number of jurors remaining in the box, the prosecutor would have to
show cause with respect to the jurors recalled to make up the required number. Id.
44. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119. The framers of the Constitution
considered but rejected inclusion of the peremptory challenge right as a constitutional requirement.
See Pamela R. Garfield, Comment, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Discriminationby any Other
Name..., 72 DEwy. U. L. REv. 169, 172 (1994); Salvatore Picariello, Recent Case, 23 SEToN
HALL L. REv. 1160, 1164 (1993).
45. A defendant was entitled to 35 peremptory strikes in treason trials and 20 in trials for other
felonies that were punishable by death. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30.
46. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
47. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 218. The Court noted, "In contrast to the course in England, where
both peremptory challenge and challenge for cause have fallen into disuse, peremptories were and
are freely used and relied upon in this country. . . ." Id.
48. See id. at 218-19.
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jurors who have been deemed qualified to serve fairly and impartially on

a particular case. The order of the voir dire process affords litigants an
opportunity to challenge a potential juror for cause before exercising
peremptory challenges. Therefore, a litigant's peremptory strike excludes

a potential juror who was not challenged for cause by the litigant or for
whom the court specifically did not find cause to exclude from jury
service.
Peremptory challenges are generally exercised on the basis of the
individual trial attorney's intuition as to the desirability of the particular
juror.49 Prior to Batson, courts were generally reluctant to question the
motivation underlying a litigant's peremptory challenge. 0 The absence
of judicial supervision over the exercise of peremptory challenges
frequently subordinated the constitutional rights of a potential juror to a
litigant's interest in unfettered utilization of the peremptory challenge.
The Supreme Court in Batson and its progeny recognized the conflict
between a litigant's unrestricted use of the peremptory challenge and a
potential juror's equal protection interests, and has resolved the conflict
in favor of the latter.
C. Batson Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge
In Swain v. Alabama,"l the Supreme Court decided the first equal
protection challenge to the use of the peremptory strike during the jury
selection process. In Swain, an all-white jury convicted a black defendant
of rape and sentenced him to death.5" The petitioner in Swain supported
his equal protection challenge by noting that the prosecution exercised
peremptory challenges to strike all six African-Americans from the jury

49. See State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1167 (N.J. 1986) (noting that an attorney, when
explaining the criteria upon which he exercised a peremptory challenge, cited '"gut reaction' based
upon 'my life experience"'); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 146 (1994) ("Lawyers have always
relied on hunches, intuition, and their ideas about stereotypes to distinguish proprosecution jurors

from prodefense jurors.").
50. The nature of the "peremptory challenge gives a party the right to have an individual
prospective juror excused without explanation." STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 2.12, at
52 (citing 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 384 (2d ed. 1982)).
However, prior to Batson, several state supreme courts disallowed the use of peremptory challenges
based on group bias for race, sex, religion, or national origin. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, 771 n.3 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). Federal and state statutes also limit

the use of peremptory challenges. See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1994); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAW § 13
(McKinney 1993).
51. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
52. See id. at 203.
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panel. 3 The petitioner also pointed to evidence that although blacks had
in fact been called to jury service in Talladega County, Alabama, none
had actually participated as a petit juror for fourteen years.5 4 Although
the Swain Court recognized that selection for jury service should not be
determined by an individual's race,55 it set a virtually insurmountable
evidentiary standard5 6 for establishing the existence of racial discrimination in the selection process. In order to prevail on an equal protection
challenge under Swain, the petitioner needed to establish that the
government had engaged in a pattern of systematic elimination of black
venirepersons from the jury. 7 The Court determined that the petitioner
had not met this burden. 8 As a result, the challenge was allowed to
stand, and the potential juror was excluded from service.
In the landmark case Batson v. Kentucky, 9 the Court reconsidered
the standard established in Swain as it applied to a prosecutor's
peremptory challenges.' In Batson, an African-American was convicted
of burglary by an all-white jury selected from a panel from which the
prosecution had eliminated four black venirepersons. 61 The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to discharge the jury, rejecting defendant's
claim that the prosecution's exercise of peremptory strikes violated both
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair crosssection of the community and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the laws.62 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.63 The United States Supreme Court reversed

53. Id. at 205.
54. See id. However, black individuals had served on grand juries, including the one that

indicted the petitioner. Id.
55. See id. at 204 ("'[J]urymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual
qualifications, and not as members of a race."' (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286
(1950))); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1434 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ('[A] juror sits not as a representative of a racial or sexual group but as an individual

citizen.").
56. In MeCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated,478 U.S. 1001 (1986),
the Second Circuit indicated that the Swain burden of proof had been met only twice: State v.

Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979), and State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
57. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.

58. Id. at 226.
59. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
60. See id.at 82.
61. Id. at 82-83.
62. Id. at 83. The Court also noted that the denial of participation in jury service based upon

race constitutes unconstitutional discrimination by the State against the excluded juror. See id. at 87
(citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)).
63. See id. at 84.
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the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court and established new
precedent for evaluating a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory strikes.
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges against individual jurors on the basis of race.' 4
In contrast to Swain, the Batson Court indicated that a defendant can
establish a prima facie case65 of purposeful discrimination in the jury
selection process without demonstrating a historic or widespread pattern
of discrimination by the prosecution. 66 The defendant must show only
that the circumstances surrounding a particular challenge raise an
inference that the prosecutor challenged the potential juror on the basis
of race.67 Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a "race-neutral"
explanation for striking the juror.68 Therefore, upon the trial court's
determination that the defendant has set forth prima facie evidence of the
discriminatory nature of a particular strike, the prosecution can no longer
rely upon the discretionary nature of peremptory challenges. The
prosecution must provide an explanation for the peremptory strike
sufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case. In order to meet this
burden, the race-neutral explanation must be "'clear and reasonably

64. Id.
65. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must show: (1)that he is a member of a
"cognizable racial group"; (2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
members of the defendant's race from the venire; and (3) that these facts and other relevant
circumstances "raise an inference" that peremptory challenges have been used by the prosecutor to
exclude veniremen from the jury on account of their race. Id. at 96. In Powers v. Ohio, the Court
determined that a criminal defendant has standing to raise the equal protection claim of an individual
excluded from jury service. 499 U.S. 400,413-15 (1991). A petitioner's claim is not barred because
his race differs from that of the excluded juror. See id at 415. Therefore, the Court effectively
eliminated the first prong of the Batson test--that the defendant be a member of a cognizable racial
group-by allowing a white criminal defendant to challenge the state's use of peremptory challenges
against prospective black jurors. BENNETr & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 25, § 17.14.
In Batson, the Court provided factors for determining whether the defendant had established
a prima facie case: (1) evidence of a pattern of strikes against those of a particular race: and (2) the
nature of the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire and when exercising challenges.
476 U.S. at 97. Lower courts have cited other factors, such as: (1) whether most or all of the
members of an identified group have been struck from the venire; (2) whether a disproportionate
number of peremptory challenges were used to exclude specific racial or ethnic groups; or (3)
whether excluded jurors shared race as their only common characteristic. See People v. McDonald,
530 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Il1. 1988); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1164-65 (N.J. 1986) (citing
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 764 (Cal. 1978)).
66. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96.
67. See id. at 96.
68. Id. at 97.
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specific."' 69 It is the role of the trial court to assess the race-neutral
explanation proffered by the prosecution and to determine whether it is
pretextual or sincere.70
The Court in Batson did not deviate from its holding in Swain that
the defendant does not possess the right to a jury made up, in whole or
in part, of members of the defendant's own race.71 The right at issue
was not the right of the defendant to be tried by a jury of which
members of his own race are represented. Instead, the nature of the right
at issue in Batson was the denial of equal protection to the defendant by
purposely excluding members of his own race from the jury.72
In the line of cases succeeding Batson, the Supreme Court clarified
the underlying rationale of the Batson Doctrine in terms of protecting the
equal protection rights of the prospective juror. Following Batson was the
case of Powers v. Ohio.73 In Powers, the Court faced the issue of
whether the prohibition against racial discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges should be imposed to protect the rights of the
prospective juror in the absence of any violation of the rights of the
defendant. In its decision, the Court ruled that a white criminal defendant
is allowed to object to the prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory strike
of black venirepersons.74 Although his own equal protection rights were
not implicated by the discriminatory challenges, the white defendant in
Powers successfully asserted the equal protection claim of the excluded
jurors under the principle of third-party standing.75
69. Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258
(1981)).
70. See id. at 98. "[T]he prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise
of a challenge for cause." Id. at 97. A prosecutor may not, however, rebut a defendant's prima facie

case of discrimination by stating that he challenged the jurors sharing the same race as the defendant
because of their shared race. Id Additionally, a prima facie case is not rebutted by the prosecutor's
denial of discriminatory motive or his affirmation of good faith in exercising peremptory challenges.
Id. at 98. A race-neutral explanation is one "based on something other than the race of the juror,"
Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 3523 360 (1991), and must be "related to the particular case to

be tried." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The acceptability of a proffered justification should be determined
by an analysis by the trial court of: "(1) the specificity of the explanation; (2) whether the reason
is rationally related to the juror's qualifications or bias; and (3) whether the explanation is given in
good faith." BENNETr & HIRSChHORN, supra note 25, § 17.14.
71. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879)).

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303).
499 U.S. 400 (1991).
See id. at 404, 415.
See id. at 415. The Court found that the petitioner met each requirement of the three part

test for vicarious standing: (1) 'injury in fact,' thus giving [the litigant] a 'sufficiently concrete
interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute[; (2)] a close relation to the third party[; and (3)]
some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Id. at 411 (citations
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In further developing the Batson Doctrine in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,76 the Supreme Court extended the reach of Batson to
peremptory challenges employed by civil litigants. In Edmonson, an
African-American plaintiff objected to his adversary's exclusion of black
jurors without the articulation of a race-neutral basis for the challenge.77
The Supreme Court again held that exclusion of prospective jurors on the
basis of race violates their equal protection rights. 7' Further, Edmonson
resolved the issue of whether such discriminatory conduct by a private
litigant constitutes state action. The Court concluded that a litigant's use
79
of peremptory challenges satisfies the two-pronged state action test.
As to the first prong, the Court found that "[p]eremptory challenges are
permitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems
it appropriate to allow parties to exclude [otherwise qualified persons
from jury service]. 80 With regard to the second prong of the test, the
Court noted that, in exercising a peremptory challenge, the litigant is
acting in accordance with "state procedures [and] with 'the overt,
significant assistance of state officials.''. Even though a particular
peremptory challenge is a function of the litigant's prerogative, the
litigant assumes the status of a state actor because of the context in
which the peremptory challenge is executed.
In applying Batson to the private litigant, the Court was motivated
by the compelling nature of Batson's underlying policy against any form
of invidious discrimination in the jury selection process. The Edmonson

omitted) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 113-14, 115-16 (1976)). The Court
explained, "The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution causes a criminal
defendant cognizable injury, and the defendant has a concrete interest in challenging the practice."
Id. The Court continued, "[T]he relation between petitioner and the excluded jurors is as close as,
if not closer than, those we have recognized to convey third-party standing in our prior cases. Voir
dire permits a party to establish a relation, if not a bond of trust,
with the jurors." Id. at 413
(citations omitted). "The reality is that a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the
courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his
own rights." Id. at 415.

76. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
77. Id. at 616-17.

78. Id. at 628.
79. Id. at 620-22; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (explaining
that to determine whether state action exists, the two questions to be addressed are: (1) whether the
claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state
authority; and (2) whether a person charged with inflicting the deprivation may be appropriately
characterized as a state actor).
80. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.

81. Id. at 622 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486
(1988)).
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Court explained, "If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial
democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race
stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury."182 The Court noted that the courtroom, in particular, is a forum in
which there is a "real expression of the constitutional authority of the
government" and that, therefore, "[r]ace discrimination within the
courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings
conducted there. 8 3
In Georgia v. McCollum,84 the Supreme Court further cemented the
state action analysis it introduced in Edmonson. McCollum involved the
prosecution's objection to a criminal defendant's racially motivated
peremptory strike."5 In keeping with the reasoning of its state action
analysis in Edmonson, the McCollum Court held that a criminal
defendant who discriminatorily removes prospective jurors from the panel
obtains the status of state actor.86 The Court concluded that the harm
suffered by the prospective juror and the damage to the integrity of the
system, as a result of a criminal defendant's discriminatory challenge, is
of the same nature as the harm Batson sought to redress.8 7 The Court,
therefore, afforded the prosecutor third-party standing to assert the equal
protection right of the juror.88 The Court further determined that a
criminal defendant exercising a peremptory challenge possesses no
greater right to discriminate invidiously against prospective jurors on the
basis of race than does a prosecutor or civil litigant. 89 Accordingly, a
criminal defendant is required to articulate a race-neutral ground for any
peremptory challenge that appears on its face to be racially motivated."
Finally, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,91 the latest decision in
the Batson line of cases, the Supreme Court addressed the application of
Batson to gender-motivated peremptory challenges. In what is considered
by some commentators to be the Court's broadest interpretation of the
Batson Doctrine92 the Court held that a litigant's exercise of a peremp82. Id. at 630-31.

83. Id. at 628.
84. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
85. Id. at 44.

86. See id. at 52-55.
87. Id. at 48-50.
88. Id. at 56.
89. See id. at 57-59.
90. Id. at 59.
91. 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
92. See, e.g., Christopher M. Ferdico, Note, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge: J.E.B.
v. Alabama, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1177, 1198 (1995); Lance Koonce, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
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tory strike based upon the gender of the prospective juror violates the
juror's right to equal protection of the law. 3 The Court concluded that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender-based, as well as racebased, discrimination, and that gender-based classifications are subject to
heightened scrutiny.9 4 Furthermore, in the context of jury selection,
gender-based discrimination poses the same danger to the process, and
to its participants, as racially motivated strikes. 5 A litigant who
produces prima facie evidence that her adversary's peremptory challenge
is gender-based shifts to the adversary the burden of articulating a
gender-neutral explanation for the strike.96
The evolution of the Batson Doctrine demonstrates the Supreme
Court's increasing sensitivity to the equal protection interests of
prospective jurors. The underlying rationale of the Batson Doctrine is
that "individual jurors themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory jury
selection procedures."97 The Supreme Court reasoned that summary
exclusion from jury service that perpetuates discrimination based upon
stereotypical assumptions is antithetical to this nation's justice system98
and violates the constitutional rights of the individual prospective juror.
Weighing the government's interest in affording litigants unrestricted
discretion in utilizing peremptory challenges against the constitutional
rights of prospective jurors, the Supreme Court concluded that discriminatory peremptory challenges do not further any important governmental
objective. 9
Although the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to extend the
reach of Batson beyond its original facts, all of the Court's decisions to
date expanding the doctrine have been grounded in the prospective
juror's equal protection guarantee against discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, or national origin. The Supreme Court has not ruled upon
Batson's application to peremptory challenges that discriminate against

rel. T.B. and the Fateof the Peremptory Challenge, 73 N.C. L. REV. 525, 525-26 (1995); Susan A.
Winchurch, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: The Supreme CourtMoves Closer to Elimination
of the Peremptory Challenge, 54 MD. L. REV,. 261 (1995).
93. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
94. Id. at 1424-25.
95. Id. at 1427.
96. Id. at 1429.

97. Id. at 1427 (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)).
98. See id. at 1428 n. 13 ("The exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms
that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system.").
99. See id. at 1425-26.
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prospective jurors on the basis of their First Amendment activities. l0
For the reasons stated below, an expansion of the Batson Doctrine to the
First Amendment context is logical and consistent with Batson's
underlying purpose.

m.
A.

PLACING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE PRIVILEGE IN
PERSPECTIVE

The Peremptory Challenge: Neither ConstitutionallyProtected nor
Essential to a FairTrial
While the peremptory challenge enjoys a long history as an integral

fixture in our trial process, it is not constitutionally mandated.' 1 The
peremptory challenge is neither specifically referred to in the text of the

Constitution nor implicitly required to satisfy any constitutionally
guaranteed rights afforded to a litigant at trial.'0 2
In addition to the absence of constitutional protection, the peremptory challenge also falls outside the rubric of trial procedures that are
essential for a fair trial. Jury composition, and the selection process that
creates the jury, may affect the fairness of the trial and the public

100. See supra note 13. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct.
1769 (1995), does not detract from the argument for Batson's First Amendment expansion. In
Purkeu,the defendant objected to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge to two potential jurors who
were members of the defendant's racial group. Id. at 1770. The Government argued that it struck one
of the prospective jurors because he had long hair, a moustache, and a beard. Id. The Court held that
this was a race-neutral use of a peremptory challenge. Id. at 1771. "'The wearing of beards is not
a characteristic that is peculiar to any race."' Id. (quoting EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d
188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980). The Court also added: "And neither is the growing of long, unkempt
hair." Id.
Neither the Court nor the litigant's raised the issue of a potential violation of the prospective
juror's First Amendment speech rights. Although personal appearance may, under certain
circumstances, constitute a form of symbolic speech, there must be a "communicative element ... sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376 (1968); see Alabama and Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy Independent School District, 817 F.
Supp. 1319, 1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (wearing of long hair held to be a protected expression under
the First Amendment); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971) (upholding of school
regulation of long hair despite the fact that it may constitute symbolic speech); see also JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 16A9 (4th ed. 1991).
101. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
102. "Although peremptory challenges are valuable tools in jury trials, they 'are not
constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather they are but one state-created means to the
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial."' J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 n.7 (quoting
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57); see also Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
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0
perception of justice at work."
However, the integrity of the jury
would not be compromised even by the total elimination of the
peremptory challenge.' °4 The peremptory challenge, unlike the challenge for cause, is not specifically designed to target unqualified
jurors.' No rule of law or practice requires that a litigant's exercise

of a peremptory challenge relate in any way to the juror's ability to sit
impartially on the case."° Indeed, litigants utilize the peremptory
challenge as a strategic device to design a jury sympathetic to the

particular litigant's case.'0 7 Therefore, neutral potential jurors may be
excluded in favor of other more partial jurors. This result is
counterintuitive to the concept of a fair and unbiased jury.
Some commentators elevate the importance of peremptory challenges based on the theory that challenges for cause are insufficient for
eliminating bias.'0 8 They argue that, all too often, a lawyer's "gut
instinct" of a juror's bias can be an accurate assessment of bias but is not
one that the lawyer can readily "prove" during voir dire."° The argument follows that, since the lawyer is unable to meet his burden of
establishing that the juror is unfit, a challenge for cause will not be
available to remove the juror. The reasoning underlying this contention
is unpersuasive.
103. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). The Court stated:
Within the courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine the rights of those
who stand before it. In full view of the public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give
testimony, juries render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure that justice
is done.
...[D]iscrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the
fairness of the proceedings conducted there.
1d. "The community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group
stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned
discrimination in the courtroom engenders." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
104. "The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process.., should
ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system." Batson, 476 U.S. at
107 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Raymond J.Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be
Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 422 (1992) (stating that the peremptory challenge is a "flaw in
our judicial fabric" which should be totally abolished).
105. "Unlike challenges for cause, peremptory strikes require no justification, no spoken word
of explanation, no reason at all beyond a hunch, an intuition." ABRAMSON, supra note 49, at 131.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 113 (1984); Robert E. Cartwright, Jury
Selection, TRIAL, Dec. 1977, at 28-29.
108. See, e.g., Christopher Karsten, Comment, One Step Too Far: The Supreme CourtDenies
CriminalDefendants the Unfettered Use of the Peremptory Challenge in Georgia v. McCollum, 27
VAL. U. L. REV. 287, 307 (1992).
109. For a discussion of what a litigant must prove in order to remove a juror for cause, see
Hittner & Nichols, supra note 38, at 445-47.
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If it is assumed, arguendo, that opponent's of this Article's
application of Batson are correct in their assertion that challenges for
cause are insufficient to eliminate bias, it would become necessary to
reexamine what constitutes bias in jury selection. Their argument
necessitates an overly broad definition of bias. To these critics, bias is
not simply the inability of a prospective juror to sit fairly and impartially
but also improperly includes the potential that the juror may find facts
antagonistic to the litigant's desired results.
The claim that peremptory challenges should be utilized to
compensate for deficiencies in the administration of challenges for cause
ignores the simplest and most appropriate cure for the alleged deficiency:
a requirement that trial courts afford attorneys a fair opportunity to
establish a basis for a challenge for cause. To the extent that appropriate
limitations on the peremptory challenge privilege highlight judicial
deficiencies regarding challenges for cause, the constitutional limitations
on the peremptory challenge privilege suggested by this Article may
indeed serve to enhance the proper functioning of the challenge for
cause. Moreover, deficiencies in the implementation of challenges for
cause should be addressed directly and should not serve as an excuse for
the expansion of peremptory challenges beyond constitutional limitations.
Such utilization distorts the intended function of the peremptory
challenge and undermines the credibility of the challenge for cause as the
mechanism for ensuring the jury's impartiality.
If after an appropriate opportunity to support her contention that a
juror is biased, an attorney is unable to meet an objective legal test for
an exclusion for cause, the trial court may properly deny the exclusion.
The court's denial in these circumstances, while frustrating to the litigant,
is not conceptually distinct from any other instance in which a litigant
believes her claim to be meritorious but is nevertheless unable to prevail
due to an inability to garner the requisite proof."'
At the core of a litigant's rigid attachment to the peremptory
challenge is an assumption that an individual's perceptions and responses
are influenced by human characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender,
socioeconomic status, demographics, and religious, political, and
philosophical beliefs that comprise the individual. The validity of this
assumption does not provide any justification for discriminatory

110. Within the framework proposed by this Article, the attorney who is unable to develop her
intuition into proof of bias may nevertheless be able to remove the juror through the exercise of a
peremptory challenge. So long as the impression is not based upon factors that implicate the juror's
exercise of a constitutional right, the peremptory challenge is valid.
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exclusion of potential jurors. The fact that a prospective juror does not
reach the jury box as a "blank slate" does not render the juror "biased"
under the standard accepted for exclusion of jurors for cause. Our justice
system does not automatically equate with a lack of fitness for jury
service the unique human qualities and life experiences that comprise the
individual and comport with our treasured notion of human individuality.
A discomfort with the potential effects of human individuality on
jury verdicts fuels the opposition to any limitations upon the exercise of
peremptory challenges. Those who oppose either restricting or eliminating peremptory challenges on the theory that peremptory challenges are
necessary to achieve a fair trial, view the peremptory challenge as a
challenge for "semi-cause." Under this view, the fact that a potential
juror is not a completely neutral slate undermines the fairness of a
verdict in which that juror participated. To the extent that society is
prepared to equate a well-developed persona, pre-existing beliefs, and a
background rich in life experience with an inability to fulfill the role of
an impartial juror, consideration must be given to issues such as the
appropriate threshold for an exclusion for cause, the definition of
impartiality, and perhaps the desirability of our present jury system. Only
upon recognition of the distinction between the peremptory challenge and
the challenge for cause--and their relative importance to a fair, impartial
trial--can we place in proper perspective the imposition on litigants of
further peremptory challenge regulation.
B.

The Peremptory Challenge: A Limited Privilege

The privilege of exercising peremptory challenges against prospective jurors is already far from absolute. Constraints on peremptory
challenges are imposed by the Supreme Court,' statutes," 2 and
court rules." 3 Additionally, judges may, within their discretion," 4 place
limits on various practical aspects of the selection process. Judicially
imposed constraints include the number of challenges afforded a6
litigant 115 and the procedures under which they may be utilized."

111. See supra notes 59-99 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 27, 41 and accompanying text.
113. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
114. See United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 151 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065
(1980); see also Phyllis N. Silverman, Comment, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges:
Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44 U. PiTT. L. REv. 673, 703 (1983).
115. See Silverman, supra note 114, at 702-03.
116. See Morris, 623 F.2d at 151-52.
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Judges may also set forth the number of peremptories based upon the
nature of the case and the number of parties to the action. 7 The trial
judge may require multiple defendants to share a set number of
challenges." 8
In addition, either local court rules or the individual judge determines the particular procedure used for peremptorily challenging jurors.
For instance, a court may require litigants to exercise peremptory
challenges to an entire prospective panel before impaneling the first six
or twelve remaining jurors. 19 Alternatively, a court might require
litigants to levy challenges against potential jurors who are initially
seated in the jury box and replace challenged jurors with previously
unseated panelists. 2 ' A trial judge may also have discretion to entertain
peremptory challenges either outside or in the presence of other
1
12

jurors.

Court procedures for selecting and striking alternate jurors also
vary."z Trial courts are afforded great latitude in implementing particular jury selection procedures despite the limitations they place upon the
litigant's freedom to exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The many
statutory and court imposed restrictions on peremptory challenges place
their subordinate status in perspective and demonstrate that the peremptory challenge is more in the nature of a privilege than an absolute
right.

124

117. Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
39, 62-63 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982).
118. For a discussion of the various ways in which peremptory challenges are employed when
multiple defendants are involved, see STARR & MCCoRMIcK, supra note 35, § 2.12, at 55 (citing
3 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 23, No. 15-2.6(a) commentary at 63-67).
119. See BENNETr & HiRSCHORN, supra note 25, §§ 17.2, .4.
120. Id. §§ 17.2-.5.
121. See id. §§ 17.18-.23; see also United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145, 151 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980).
122. As a guide, many states follow Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
123. See Morris,623 F.2d at 151 (explaining that the formulation of appropriate procedures in
administering peremptory challenges is subject to the broad discretion of the trial judge).
124. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. Peremptory challenge regulations are akin
to other established practices and tenets promoting the notion that a just result is accomplished
through strict adherence to established rules and procedures. For instance, the rules of evidence are
inherently exclusionary, limiting that which a litigant may argue or present to the jury. Rules of
jurisdiction and venue dictate which courts are available to hear a case. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET
AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.1 (4th ed. 1992). Statutes and court rules adopted by various jurisdictions,
as well as the practices of individual trial judges, impose further restraints on a litigant's autonomy.
These rules and regulations, within which a litigant must operate, are not designed to impose
arbitrary constraints upon the litigant's freedom. Rather, the purpose of such limitations is to promote
a greater degree of structure and provide procedural as well as substantive safeguards against abuses
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C. The Peremptory Challenge: The Litigant'
Desirefor a "Partial"Jury
The peremptory challenge remains a favorite tool of the trial lawyer
because it provides her with a great measure of control. Litigants
endeavor to employ the peremptory challenge to maximize control of
case determination through the selection of "favorable" jurors.'2 5
Efforts to restrict the litigant's ability to influence juror selection are
generally met with opposition, and even hostility. 2 6 These opponents
view limitations on peremptory challenges as an encroachment on a
valued entitlement. 27 This view portrays a misunderstanding of both
the extent of the peremptory challenge privilege and the actual role
played by the peremptory challenge in ensuring a fair and impartial jury.
The competitive nature of our adversarial system and a lawyer's
ethical responsibility to represent her client zealously all but ensure that
a litigant will seek to construct the most partial jury possible. In
furtherance of winning the case, litigants may seek to exclude not only
antagonistic jurors, but also neutral jurors in an effort to include the
greatest number of jurors who exhibit qualities which the advocate
believes will further the best interests of her case. Far from creating a
completely neutral adjudicative body, the advocate's goal is to form a
jury with the maximum degree of bias; bias which will sway the jury to
the litigant's favor. Therefore, the advocate will use her peremptory
challenges as a strategic tool to "stack the jury."
A system of unfettered discretion in the exclusion of prospective
jurors does not serve the purpose of ensuring an impartial jury. A
principle underlying our adversarial system is that the competing interests
of the judicial system. The imposition of such rules limits the litigant's control over the trial process
and thereby achieves the goal of fairness. See id.§ 1.I. The basic premise of achieving fairness
through constraints on the litigant's autonomy has general applicability and includes limitations on
a litigant's ability to control the selection of jurors. See id. § 8.14.
125. Robert Cartwright, former president of the American Trial Lawyers Association, advocates
use of the peremptory challenge as a means for trial attorneys to select jurors who will "identify with
and be sympathetic to their clients" and thereby provide the clients with a tremendous advantage.
R.E. CARTWRIGHT, JURY SELECTION, TRIAL 28-31 (1977).

126. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN.
L. REv. 545 (1975) (arguing that the rights to voir dire and peremptory challenges are necessary to
producing an impartial jury and that regulation of these rights should be directed towards increasing
their effectiveness to all litigants).
127. Id. at 555-56 (offering historical and functional arguments favoring the constitutional
necessity of peremptory challenges). Professor Babcock explains, "[Q]uite aside from the impartial
jury guarantee, the peremptory challenge is inherent in the jury trial right itself .... Id. at 556.
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of two litigants--to achieve the jury most favorably inclined toward their
own positions-will balance one another, resulting in the creation of a
fair and impartial jury." With the system working ideally, each side's
attempt to create a favorably disposed jury will be tempered by their
opponent's competing desire to create the same. In theory, each side uses
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors with the greatest tendency to
favor its adversary's position, resulting in a jury that will be the closest
possible to a neutral, blank slate. This theory assumes, of course, that
each litigant is equally able to detect, and therefore eliminate, those
jurors most likely to be favorably disposed toward the other side. 29
Even if we accept the theory that, in our adversarial trial system, a
litigant's attempt to manipulate the selection ofjurors will be counterbalanced by his opponent's exercise of the same power, we do not
automatically dispose of all procedural safeguards against abuses to the
system. The American system of justice does not completely rely upon
the expectation that the adversarial nature of our system will ensure the
fairness of the proceedings. Justice depends upon the combination of the
adversarial process and judicial checks on the litigants who operate
within the process.
A parallel restriction on a litigant's ability to control the selection
of those responsible for adjudicating the case is the prohibition against
"judge-shopping." The judge-shopping limitation is total and complete,
regardless of whether the judge is sitting as the arbiter of law, fact, or
both. 3 Judge-shopping is viewed as antithetical to the integrity of the
adjudicative process.' Indeed, it would seem absurd to provide the
litigant with the power to dismiss a presiding judge merely because she
senses that the judge does not appear to be favorably disposed to either
her or her case. The judge's race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliations,

128. Barbara L. Horwitz, Comment, The Extinction ofthe Peremptory Challenge: What Will the
Jury System Lose By Its Demise?, 61 U. IN. L. REv. 1391, 1399 (1993) (citing Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1990)).
129. This assumption of an equal balance of power between opposing litigants, however, may

not prove accurate. In cases where one side has greater resources to expend on the jury selection
process, this assumption may be undermined. To the extent that an imbalance of power exists, in
general, the adversarial system is not a sufficient insurer of a just result. See Stephen P. Jones, Note,
The Prosecutor'sConstitutionalDuty to Disclose ExculpatoryEvidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 735,
743-44 (1995). The limited effect of the adversarial system holds true in the context ofjury selection
as well.
130. See Christopher R. Carton, Comment, Disqualifying Federal Judges for Bias: A
Consideration of the ExtrajudicialBias Limitationfor Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057, 2092 (1994).
13 I.Id. at 2095.
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group memberships, previous judicial opinions, or extra-judicial writings
do not give the litigant grounds to excuse the judge, unless such factors
rise to a level requiring judicial recusal. 32 There is no functional
equivalent of a peremptory challenge in the selection of a presiding
judge. To allow litigants to judge-shop would improperly permit the
litigants to manipulate the trial process and undermine the justice system.
Similar to judge-shopping, the peremptory challenge enables the
litigant to manipulate the selection of jurors. Accordingly, restricting a
litigant's control over the selection of jurors limits her ability to
manipulate the selection of the trier of fact.
In addition to the fact that an adversarial jury selection process may
indeed run counter to the goal of attaining an impartial jury, the
adversarial nature of jury selection, in and of itself, does not protect the
rights of prospective jurors who are subject to the process. The
advocate's responsibility is to pursue the interest of her client. To the
extent that the potential juror's interests are inconsistent with those of the
litigant, the advocate will properly advance only the interest of the
litigant. The fact that two litigants are at odds in a lawsuit does not
ensure that one of the litigant's will pursue the rights of the prospective
juror. In fact, each litigant may seek to invade the juror's private beliefs
during the jury selection process. Additionally, each litigant may seek to
exclude the same juror.
D. The Peremptory Challenge: The Perpetuation of Stereotypes
Trial attorneys developing a methodology for exercising peremptory
challenges often rely on generic, assumed correlations between particular
characteristics and attitudes in jurors.133 Some litigators develop
selection criteria based on their individual views of which personal

132. "'Prejudice growing out of business, political, or social relations has been held insufficient

to disqualify a judge."' Scott v. Class, 532 N.W.2d 399, 404 (S.D. 1995) (quoting 46 AM. JuR. 21,
Judges § 162 (1994)).
133. For examples of how litigants use a juror's gender or occupation to predict attitudes, see
Hans & Vidmar, supranote 117, at 63-64; see also Horwitz, supranote 128, at 1403 n.66 (ranking,

in order of importance, the characteristic factors significant in juror selection: (1) Personal
characteristics-intelligence, education, strong-mindedness, physical infirmity; (2) Occupation; (3)
Personality; (4) Race; (5) Physical signs; (6) Nationality; (7) Body language; (8) Sex; (9) Age; and
(10) Marital status (citing ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JRY 64-65 (1979))); ANN
F. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVL & CRIMINAL TRIALS § 19.11, at 1067 (2d ed. 1985) (citing

the Sannito-Amolds study which "found a high frequency of 'prosecution jurors' among those in
precision occupations such as secretaries, engineers, programmers, machinists, bankers, bookkeepers,
accountants, and supervisors of many employees").
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attributes are the most effective indicators of how a person will vote, as
well as upon anecdotal data from past cases.' 34 Furthermore, attorneys
frequently utilize a body of literature that proposes direct relationships
between particular juror attributes and the verdicts they reach.'35
Another word for these relationships is "stereotypes." Some

attorneys reject these stereotypes as broad generalizations that cannot
reliably predict juror voting tendencies.' 36 These critics assert that

reliance upon generalizations can actually distract a litigant from criteria
that will more accurately assess the favorability of the juror.'3 7 Nevertheless, popular stereotypes provide the basis upon which many trial
attorneys decide to exclude particular jurors. 3
In fact, an entire "science" and a lucrative industry has developed
around the strategy of exercising peremptory challenges. An increasing
number of litigants with adequate financial resources are hiring
consultants to assist them in the process of selecting jurors.'39 Consulting practices range in level of sophistication. A relatively modest form
of jury selection "science" involves hiring an expert who observes the
voir dire process and provides the litigant with a professional "judgment"
about prospective jurors. At a more sophisticated level, the consultant
stages a simulated trial and hires "mock jurors" to observe the trial and
describe their reactions to the arguments. The purchased responses from
the mock jurors become the data on which the consultant creates a

134. See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 117, at 63-64.
135. See, e.g., EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 430-31 (8th ed.
1970); GINGER, supra note 133, at 1092, 1102 (including a sample jury questionnaire developed by
trial attorneys that probe a prospective juror's ethnic background, religion, organizational
membership, and political affiliations).
136. See Jay M. Spears, Note, Voir Dire: EstablishingMinimum Standards to Facilitatethe
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493, 1504 (1975).
137. "Because attorneys often have insufficient information to make individual judgments about
the unconscious prejudices of prospective jurors, they tend to act on the basis of stereotypes and
presumptions" Note, Limiting the PeremptoryChallenge:Representation of Groups on PetitJuries,
86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1720-21 (1977) (footnote omitted).
138. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHt. L. REV. 153, 210 (1989). In the article,
Alschuler cites to a manual produced by Dallas, Texas, District Attorney Wade, which instructs
prosecutors to use popular stereotypes in striking potential jurors, including indications that women
jurors can't be trusted, except when using their "women's intuition" in cases involving crimes
against children. Id. Another excerpt stated that "[e]xtremely overweight people, especially women
and young men, indicates a lack of self-discipline and often times instability. I like the lean and
hungry look." Id. The manual was leaked to Justice Marshall and used in his concurrence in Batson
v. Kentucky. Id.
139. See ABRAMSON, supra note 49, at 146-49.
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composite profile of the most and least ideal prospective juror.4 0 The
desirable juror will have those common characteristics found among the
observers who indicated favorable reactions to the litigant's position in
the case. Thus, the jury consultant infers a correlation between the shared
attributes and the likelihood of a particular attitude toward the case. She
then extends this inference to the chance of a juror voting for a particular
verdict.141
An alternate jury selection consulting method consists of an expert
designing a prototype of the ideal juror based on more general inferences
about the correlation between personal characteristics and beliefs held by
individuals with those characteristics. 42 Jury consultants may also
study area demographics to supplement their data. 43
The underlying assumption in the field of jury science is that certain
characteristics of an individual, such as age, race, ethnicity, religion,
employment status and history, marital and familial status, area of
residence, and political affiliations can be correlated with particular
attitudes.'" Of course, this premise is neither new nor unique to
proponents of complex jury selection methodology. Indeed, the theory
that one can predict how a juror will vote based upon specific beliefs
unrelated to the subject matter of the case is at the heart of the peremptory challenge itself.

140. See id. at 152-53. See generally Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and
Realities ofAttorney Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 229, 244 (1990) ("Some ... researchers have adopted an approach in which mock
jurors-often experienced or currently sitting jurors-are presented the same case or cases in an
effort to establish links for particular fact patterns.").
141. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 140, at 244.
142. See ABRAMSON, supra note 49, at 148.
143. "'The examination of jurors' demographic and socioeconomic characteristics is of great
Id.
I...'
at 143 (emphasis added) (quoting HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE
significance .
JURY 156 (1993)); see also id. at 148 ("Demographic data would be kept on each respondent.').
144. "[E]ach juror's psychological attributes and proclivities, which will influence a particular
verdict, are closely intertwined with the juror's ascriptive characteristics (e.g., age, race, and gender)
and socially achieved status (e.g., education and income)." ABRAMSON, supra note 49, at 143
(quoting FuKURAI ET AL., supra note 143, at 156).
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IV. EXPANDING BATSON TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A.

The Equal Protection Clause: Protecting a Juror's
FundamentalFirstAmendment Rights

A litigant's "privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory
challenges[- is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause."'4 5 The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees that the government will not subject its citizens to
unequal treatment on the basis of an individual's membership in a
cognizable group or the exercise of a fundamental right. 46 The rights
to associate and to express oneself freely are fundamental rights within
the rubric of the equal protection guarantee.'4 7 Governmental action
that inflicts disparate treatment based upon an individual's speech content
or affiliation choices is evaluated under equal protection standards.'
An equal protection evaluation depends upon the level of judicial scrutiny--using either the strict, heightened, or rational basis standard--that
is afforded to a particular classification. Therefore, under the Batson
Doctrine, application of the Court's restrictions on peremptory challenges
depends upon the level of scrutiny afforded to the particular challenge.
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., the Supreme Court noted: "Parties
may... exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
any group9 or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational basis'
14
review.'
Classifications based upon one's exercise of the fundamental rights
to associate and to speak freely are afforded strict scrutiny,5 ° two
levels of scrutiny higher than mere "rational basis."'' Accordingly, the
145. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
146. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying

strict equal protection scrutiny to the fundamental right to interstate travel); see also NowAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 100, § 14.1.
147. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).

148. See id. ('[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment
itself... [t]here is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points
of view an equal opportunity to be heard.' (footnote omitted) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1948))).
149. 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) (disallowing the exercise of gender-based peremptory
challenges because they could not withstand the "heightened" scrutiny afforded to gender-based
classifications).
150. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 100, § 14.3.
151. For a discussion ofthe three standards of review employed by courts in an equal protection
analysis, see id.
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striking of a potential juror exercising speech and association rights falls
outside of those challenges subject only to rational basis review and must
be examined under a strict scrutiny standard.
The propriety of permitting peremptory challenges motivated by a

juror's First Amendment exercise is determined by balancing the
government's interest against the constitutional infringement. The equal
protection inquiry in these circumstances requires a balancing of the
governmental interest which is furthered by the unequal treatment against
the individual's interest in the exercise of a fundamental right. 15 2 The
only governmental interest furthered by discriminatory treatment of
potential jurors, based upon their exercise of First Amendment rights, is
an interest in affording litigants greater freedom to use peremptory
challenges.'5 3 This interest is far from compelling and is insufficient to
warrant infringement on a juror's speech and association rights."5 The
governmental interest in the use of peremptory challenges, a privilege
that is not constitutionally protected and is subject to regulation, is not
more compelling than an individual juror's constitutionally protected
rights.
A prospective juror's First Amendment rights of freedom of
association and speech are fundamental rights vulnerable to infringement.
During jury selection, litigants attempt to gather as much information as
possible about each prospective juror, including any attitudes, associa-

152. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
153. Cf J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 (inquiring "whether peremptory challenges based on gender
stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury"). For a
complete discussion of the purposes served by peremptory challenges, see GOBERT & JORDAN, supra
note 15, § 8.01. See also Benjamin H. Barton, Note, Religion-BasedPeremptory Challenges After
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An EqualProtectionand FirstAmendment Analysis, 94
MICH. L. REv. 191, 208 (1995). Although Barton's analysis does find a compelling governmental
interest in allowing peremptory challenges, he concludes that religion-based peremptory challenges
do not withstand strict scrutiny review because religion-based peremptory challenges are premised
on stereotypical assumptions which are not narrowly tailored to achieve the ultimate goal of a fair
and impartial trial. Id. at 209. "Mhe available studies provide no support for the claim that religious
affiliation alone is an accurate predictor of juror attitudes." Id. In addition, Batson concludes that
because of the availability of less restrictive means to remove biased jurors, religion-based
peremptory challenges fail strict scrutiny review. Although Barton's analysis is directed toward
religion-based peremptory challenges, the same arguments apply to speech and association-based
peremptory challenges.
154. Cf Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,55 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's right
to use peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner violates the equal protection rights
of excluded jurors); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("Were
it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge
peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former.").
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tions, and opinions the juror holds which the litigant believes may affect
the juror's adjudication of the case at hand. 5 s In an effort to discover

these views, litigants seek information that implicates the juror's exercise
of association or speech rights. Moreover, based upon the information
they have obtained, litigants may utilize peremptory challenges to remove

jurors whose speech or affiliations do not meet with the litigant's
approval.
B. Illustrations of Peremptory Challenges That Implicate the
Juror' FirstAmendment Rights
In the jury selection context, questions concerning organizational
affiliations that are unrelated to juror fitness constitute an infringement
of the prospective juror's First Amendment association right. Although
a litigant may wish to question a potential juror regarding the clubs and
organizations in which the juror is a member, to the extent that probing
the juror's organizational memberships does not reveal information that
affects the juror's fitness for service, the government does not have a
substantial interest in facilitating the inquiry. For example, a juror's
membership in either the Boy Scouts of America, Green Peace, or Act
Up is inapposite to the juror's ability to render a fair and impartial
verdict in the average medical malpractice law suit. To the extent that the

potential juror may not wish to reveal such memberships, the very
question invades the juror's privacy" 6 and implicates the right to free
association."17 If a question regarding club membership is relevant to the

155. "Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon
which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
156. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining that a
prospective juror's privacy should be considered in determining scope of voir dire inquiry), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360-61 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(granting a prospective juror's petition for habeas corpus from conviction for contempt in failing to
answer voir dire questions that infringed upon her privacy rights); see also Michael R. Glover,
Comment, The Right to Privacy of ProspectiveJurors During Voir Dire, 70 CAL. L. REV. 708
(1982) (exploring the conflict of interest between parties' impartial jury rights and potential jurors'
privacy rights).
157. The Court has struck down government subpoenas requiring compulsory disclosure of
membership lists. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("This Court has recognized the vital relationship
between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."). The NAACP Court emphasized
that "privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." Id. The Court also
recognized that compulsory disclosure of membership may lead to "economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility" toward
members, thereby inducing members to withdraw from their associations. Id.
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potential juror's fitness to sit fairly and impartially on the case, then there
is merit to the position that any impact the question has on the juror's
First Amendment exercise is a necessary consequence of ensuring a fair
trial.'5 8 If, however, the question does not pertain to the juror's ability
to sit fairly and impartially, but rather is merely information that the
litigant desires for the purpose of exercising peremptory strikes, then
posing the question presents an unjustified infringement on the juror's
constitutional right to associate freely.
The way in which peremptory challenges are presently exercised
creates a danger of encroaching upon a juror's First Amendment right to
speak freely as well. By its very nature, the voir dire process requires a
prospective juror to engage in the act of speech. In contrast to the other
parts of the trial process, voir dire is designed as a mechanism whereby
prospective jurors speak about themselves, their backgrounds, and their
attitudes.159 Questioning a potential juror on matters that are not
relevant to her fitness to serve on a particular case, and excluding that
juror from service based upon answers that would not warrant an
exclusion for cause, constitutes an infringement of the potential juror's
free speech right.
As a point of illustration, in the typical trial of a "slip and fall" tort
claim, a prospective juror's views on gun control should not, in and of
itself, affect the juror's fitness for service on that case. Accordingly, a
court should not permit the litigant to base a peremptory challenge on
views expressed by the potential juror relating to gun control. One can
assume that a court concerned with efficient adjudication of the case will
be inclined, based on time limitations alone, to deny a litigant the
opportunity to delve into a juror's views on matters that do not bear
directly on the particular case. Some courts, however, are more
permissive in the way they allow litigants to question jurors.' 60 A court
may be of the view that, even though a particular question is not
158. In the above context, the compelling nature of the government's interest in eliminating
unfit potential jurors outweighs any infringement upon the potential juror's First Amendment tight.
159. Jury selection is the only opportunity during the trial for interchange between jurors and
litigants. Court rules prohibit parties and their attorneys from engaging in any discourse with jurors.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108 (1995). During the course of the
trial, the jurors' ability to communicate about the case with others, including family members, the
court, and even fellow jurors, is restricted. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132
F.R.D. 575, 576 (1991).
160. Otto G. Obermaier,Judge Conducted VoirDire,in THE JuRY 1987, at 151, 154 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 340, 1987) (noting that state trial courts in New
York, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida are more permissive in allowing
lawyer-conducted voir dire).
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pertinent to the exclusion of a juror for cause, there is "no harm" in
allowing litigants to pursue collateral matters in connection with their
exercise of peremptory challenges. 6 ' However, a more permissive
approach to the voir dire process exposes the prospective juror to
exclusion based upon an expression of speech unrelated to the juror's
ability to adjudicate the case fairly. Accordingly, a court's view in such
an instance that there is "no harm" in permitting litigants to question
jurors on collateral matters, and to base peremptory challenges on a
juror's response to such questions, betrays a lack of sensitivity to the
juror's right to free speech.
In some jurisdictions, the practice is to conduct voir dire in the
absence of any judicial officer. 62 Under such a procedure, litigants are
left unchecked in the jury selection process. Because each litigant has an
interest in extracting from potential jurors the maximum amount of
information possible, there is a heightened danger that, in the questioning
process, a prospective juror's First Amendment rights will be violated.
In the illustration involving the juror who is questioned on his views
on gun control, perhaps the juror will indicate that he strongly favors all
measures of gun control and, based upon this response, the attorney for
the defendant in the personal injury case labels him a "liberal," and
thereby predicts that he is likely to favor an injured plaintiff over a large
insurance company defendant. Counsel's peremptory removal of the juror
based upon this stereotype impermissibly excludes the juror from
participation in the trial process because of views which he expressed
that do not warrant court exclusion for cause.
In addition to the free speech implications that directly result from
the voir dire discourse, the exercise of peremptory challenges may
infringe upon the prospective juror's speech that is only peripherally
related to the voir dire process. Because many forms of communication,
including certain conduct, are considered speech,'63 a prospective juror
may exercise his right to speak in the course of the jury selection process
in ways that do not involve a direct response to a voir dire question.

161. "An appropriate question to prepare for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges
does not have to meet the same standards of relevance as one that would be used to establish a
challenge for cause." Mauldin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Plair v.
State, 279 S.W. 267, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926)).
162. See id.

163. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-20 (1989) (holding that flag burning is an
expression of free speech consistent with the First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24-26 (1971) (wearing a jacket with offensive language is protected as "speech" under the First

Amendment).
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To continue with the gun control illustration, a litigant may observe
that a prospective juror drove to the courthouse in an automobile sporting
a bumper sticker that reads "Guns don't kill people ... people kill
people." Another juror might arrive to jury duty wearing a tee shirt with
the slogan "Guns don't kill people. . bullets kill people." And a third
juror might be observed reading a National Rifle Association publication.
In these instances, the litigants have not questioned the jurors as to their
views on gun control. If, however, a litigant exercises a peremptory strike
against a juror based upon her observation of the juror's expression of
speech, 4the strike would similarly implicate the juror's freedom to
1
speak. 6
C. The Impact on the ProspectiveJuror
In order to appreciate the potential impact of the jury selection
process on the individual, one must view the experience through the
prospective juror's eyes. A potential juror is summoned to the courthouse
by court officials to participate in jury selection. After appearing within
the confines of the courthouse, the potential juror is subjected to a
qualification process through which she will either be selected or rejected
from jury service based upon the quality of her answers. In those
instances where the juror is peremptorily excluded from service, the
litigant's peremptory challenge to a juror is executed by the court. 65
To the juror, therefore, removal from jury service is the action of the
court itself. As compared with discriminatory treatment at the hands of
a litigant, the apparent denial of the juror's First Amendment rights by
a court itself may be more consequential to our justice system, and the
participants in our system, than the message gleaned from a litigant's
denial.
In addition to executing the litigant's decision to challenge the juror,
the court approves the content of the questions litigants pose during the
voir dire process. In permitting this inquiry, and the exclusion based
upon the juror's responses, the court confirms the relevance of the juror's
affiliations or exercise of speech to the juror's qualifications for service.

164. The restrictions on peremptory challenges proposed by this Article will require a trial court
to determine not only the litigant's motivation for the challenge but also whether the potential juror
is engaged in protected First Amendment activity.
165. See People v. Kern, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4,28 (App. Div. 1989), affd, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y.),
cert.denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990); see also Bill K. Felty, Comment, Resting in Mid-Air, the Supreme
CourtStrikes the TraditionalPeremptoryChallenge and Createsa New Creature,the Challengefor
Semi-Cause: Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 27 TULSA LJ. 203, 203 (1991).
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In allowing First Amendment-based peremptory challenges, the court is
inadvertently sanctioning restraints on speech or affiliation as they relate
to participation in jury service. In so sanctioning, a court undermines the
protected nature of the exercise of those precious rights, even if the
restraints do not diminish the frequency with which those rights are
practiced. Furthermore, by allowing speech and affiliation to be utilized
as a basis for juror exclusion, a court is implicitly stating that a litigant's
desire to influence the jury composition is more important than a juror's
First Amendment freedoms.
D. Protection of a PotentialJuror' FirstAmendment Freedoms
The Supreme Court has held in several contexts that actions taken
by a governmental entity with respect to an individual's speech or
organizational memberships may constitute impermissible discrimination
and, therefore, violate the First Amendment. For instance, denials of tax
exemptions,"6 unemployment benefits,167 welfare payments,"' and
public employment, 69 based upon a person's exercise of her First
Amendment rights, is an impermissible interference with a citizen's
constitutional rights. In these contexts, the Supreme Court has held:
[E]ven though a person has no "right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for
any number of reasons .... [i]t may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially,
his interest in freedom of speech. 7
A potential juror's fundamental participation in our system of justice

166. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (holding that a California statute
requiring veterans to take an oath in order to receive a tax exemption was a denial of freedom of
speech and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
167. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,410 (1963) (holding that a California statute denying

unemployment benefits to an applicant who, for religious reasons, refused to work on Saturdays
violated the First Amendment).
168. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For if the government could deny
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise
of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited."); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
643 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (likening the right to travel to the right of association in striking
down a statute which required a one year residency prerequisite in order to receive welfare
payments).
169. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that dismissal of a

teacher for publishing a letter criticizing the school board violates the First Amendment).
170. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,86 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Perry,
408 U.S. at 597).
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should not be diminished by his pursuit of a constitutionally protected
interest. As the Court has noted in the public employment context, "The
First Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its
employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not
associate."''
One cannot draw a convincing distinction between government
denial in these contexts and the governmental action of dismissing a
potential juror through a peremptory challenge based upon her exercise
of her First Amendment rights of speech or association. 72 By allowing
First Amendment-based peremptory challenges, the court is not only
sending a perverse message that the subordinate peremptory challenge
privilege is superior to the juror's First Amendment rights, but is also
implicitly conveying that certain affiliations and speech are preferable or
more acceptable to the government than others. These messages
undermine the credibility of our justice system and contradict the tenets
underlying the First Amendment.
In addition, conditioning jury service on the juror's response to
affiliation-related inquiry may have an impermissible "chilling effect" on
the juror's decision to exercise his constitutional rights. Peremptory
exclusions motivated by the juror's group affiliations or expression of
beliefs that do not warrant removal for cause are exercised on the basis
of assumed bias rather than individual bias specific to the situation. Let's
take, for example, a criminal prosecution for armed robbery. Assume,
arguendo, that members of the organization "Mothers Against Drunk
Drivers" ("M.A.D.D.") have a greater-than-average tendency to convict
in criminal prosecutions. A defense attorney's exclusion of a M.A.D.D.
member on the assumption that the individual juror will vote to convict
may not bear any relation to the individual juror's actual bias in
connection with the particular circumstances of the case at trial. The
affiliation-based exclusion wrongfully prevents a qualified, unbiased juror
from participating in jury service and perpetuates a stereotype against
M.A.D.D. members.
Similarly, exclusion from jury service may chill a prospective

171.

Id. at 76.

172. The juror acts as an agent of the government when serving on the jury. Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) ("The peremptory challenge is used in selecting
an entity that is a quintessential governmental body .... The jury exercises the power of the court
and of the government that confers the court's jurisdiction!').
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juror's exercise of her speech rights."t3 It is arguable that exclusion
from the jury does not in fact preclude the juror from wearing shirts,
sporting bumper stickers, or publicly reading material that expresses the
juror's views. However, a juror may be inhibited from wearing or
publicly displaying expressions of her views for fear of facing rejection
from service on a trial.
To the extent that there exists any risk of chilling a prospective
juror's First Amendment exercise, the government may not enforce a
discriminatory peremptory challenge motivated by the prospective juror's
speech. As previously discussed, 7 4 speech related restrictions on a
citizen's receipt of governmental benefits are not permitted. The
government may not limit employee speech that involves matters of
public concern, 75 unless it can establish that "the speech 'substantially
interfered' with government duties., 17 6 It follows from this analogy that
the government cannot, through peremptory challenges, inhibit a potential
juror's speech on matters of political or social concern that do not
substantially interfere with the juror's ability to adjudicate the case
impartially. "The government as employer has far broader powers to
restrict its employees' speech than does the government as sovereign., 17 7 Similarly, if the government-juror relationship is one of
sovereign and citizen, rather than employer-employee, the government's
intrusion on the juror's speech right is even less justified.

173. "[l]t is apparent that the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonetheless a potent
means of inhibiting speech." Pickering,391 U.S. at 574; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,

480 (1960) (striking down an Arkansas statute requiring every public-employed teacher to list
annually "every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding
five years").
174. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
175. The Supreme Court has afforded greater protection to speech involving topics of general
interest-such as political or social views-than to speech that involves only the employee's personal

disputes or grievances that have no relevance to the public. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley
College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1416-17 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146

(1983) ("When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.")).
176. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1415 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 150).

177. Id.
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Lower Court Application of Batson to a PotentialJuror' First
Amendment Association and Speech Rights

There is a paucity of authority concerning the application of the
Batson Doctrine to a juror's First Amendment rights. Only two federal
circuit courts have directly addressed Batson's applicability to speech and
association rights. Although both circuits declined to extend the doctrine,
the holdings of these courts lack both depth of analysis or any convincing rationale.
In United States v. Villarreal,'7 8 the Fifth Circuit upheld a
prosecutor's peremptory challenges to all potential jurors who indicated
an unalterable opposition to capital punishment in a prosecution in which
the United States sought the death sentence. 79 The reasoning of
Villarreal, however, is marred by the court's inability to distinguish
properly between a challenge for cause and a peremptory challenge. Had
the court concluded that a juror's fundamental opposition to the
application of the death penalty warrants exclusion of the juror for cause,
the Batson Doctrine would not have been implicated. 8 The Batson
Doctrine is not offended by the exclusion for cause of a juror who is
incapable of rendering a fair and impartial judgment because of a deeply
held belief to which the juror subscribes. 8 ' Rather than determine
whether the potential juror's opposition to the death penalty impaired the
government's ability to receive a fair trial, the Villarreal court simply
refused to find a violation of the juror's First Amendment or equal
protection rights on the grounds that "[p]olitical belief is not the overt
and immutable characteristic that race is," 82 and that extending Batson
to the First Amendment would effectively eliminate the peremptory
challenge.'83

178. 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 353 (1992).
179. See id. at 728-29.
180. Of course, it would be up to the prosecutor to convince the judge that the potential juror
could not be fair and impartial. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
181. Where the juror's deeply held belief does not affect her ability to render a fair and
impartial judgment, a litigant's peremptory exclusion on the basis of the juror's expression of her
belief is a constitutional violation worthy of protection.
182. Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 729. This decision pre-dates the Supreme Court's extension of
Batson beyond race,
183. The demise of the peremptory challenge has been predicted by critics of each expansion
of Batson. See, e.g., Ferdico, supra note 92; Horwitz, supra note 128; Winchurch, supra note 92.
Thus far, the peremptory challenge remains a viable practice. See supra notes 6, 138 and
accompanying text.
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The Tenth Circuit has also considered Batson's application in the
First Amendment context. In Morgan v. City of Albuquerque,t84 the
court declined to extend Batson to protect a juror's First Amendment
association rights. In Morgan, the plaintiff in a personal injury action
objected to the defendant's peremptory challenge of two potential jurors
based upon the jurors' "association with persons with disabilities." '85
The father of one of the excluded jurors was missing three fingers. The
other excluded juror worked as a teacher of disabled children. 86 The
court summarily disposed of the issue as follows: "Plaintiff's final
contention is that the use of peremptory challenges to strike persons who
have some association with persons with disabilities violates the potential
87
jurors' First Amendment rights. We find this argument meritless."'
It is unclear from the court's superficial treatment of the issue
whether the court's conclusion as to the absence of merit relates to
either: (1) disagreement with the premise that a juror's First Amendment
right may be implicated by association-based peremptory exclusions; or
(2) a conclusion that employment and familial relationships fall outside
of the scope of "associations" protected under the First Amendment.
Accordingly, the Morgan holding may simply be a reflection of the
court's belief that the association rights of the excused jurors were not
implicated under the specific facts of that case.
F

Lower Court Application of Batson to Religion-Based
Peremptory Challenges

An examination of lower court consideration of Batson's application
to peremptory challenges that implicate a prospective juror's religious
exercise and affiliation is instructive to an analysis of Batson's First
Amendment reach. 8 8 A handful of cases have addressed the First
Amendment implications of religion-based peremptory challenges.

184. 25 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 1994).
185. Id. at 920.
186. See id. at 919.
187. Id. at 920.
188. While this Article does not focus upon the application of Batson in the context of religionbased peremptory challenges, it assumes that Batson applies on the theory that one's religious
affiliation constitutes both a cognizable group and the exercise of a fundamental right and, therefore,
is subject to an equal protection as well as a First Amendment analysis. For a discussion of Batson's
application to religion-based peremptory challenges, see Angela J. Mason, Note, Discrimination
Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the PeremptoryChallenge'sCoffin?, 29 GA. L. REV.
493 (1995); Recent Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1994).
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In State v. Davis,189 the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to
extend the Batson Doctrine to the state's challenge of a juror based upon
his status as a Jehovah's Witness. The Minnesota court opined that "[t]he
use of the peremptory strike to discriminate purposefully on the basis of
religion does not... appear to be common and fiagrant."' 19 The court
also concluded that extending the Batson Doctrine to religion "would
unduly complicate voir dire and be excessively intrusive for the end
sought to be achieved."'1 9'
The Davis court acknowledged that inquiring about a juror's
religious affiliation on voir dire is improper unless the inquiry is
necessary to determine a challenge for cause. 192 However, the court
failed to recognize the logical inconsistency of prohibiting a litigant from
probing the religious identity of the juror for the purpose of exercising
a peremptory challenge and, yet, allowing the litigant to use that very
information to justify the challenge.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas did extend the Batson
Doctrine to religious affiliation in Casarez v. State.93 In its analysis of
the prosecutor's peremptory challenge to a Pentacostalist juror, the court
applied the strict scrutiny standard required by the Equal Protection
Clause. 4 The Texas court held that the equal protection right of the
juror was denied due to the discriminatory classification that impaired the
ability of the juror, and the entire class of Pentacostalists, to enjoy a
fundamental right to religious exercise. 95
Unlike Davis, Casarez post-dates the Supreme Court cases
expanding Batson beyond race. The Casarez court relied upon the
breadth of the Batson Doctrine and the abhorrence of stereotypical
assumptions that underlies the Batson Doctrine to reject the First
Amendment-based peremptory challenge. 6 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the state's interest in exercising religion-based peremptory
challenges in order to obtain a qualified jury is not compelling and,
therefore, cannot justify infringement of a juror's fundamental right.'9 7

189. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
190. Id. at 771.
191. Id.

192. See id. at 772 (citing Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 954 (D.C. 1977)).
193. No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (en banc), reh"g granted,
1995 WL 734238 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 1995).

194. See id. at *8.
195. See id. at *9.
196. See id. at *10.
197. See id. at *9.
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While not directly holding that Batson prohibits peremptory
challenges motivated by a juror's religious affiliation, the reasoning of
State v. Gilmore9" lends support to the proposition. In Gilmore, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower court's decision to
reverse a conviction because the prosecutor peremptorily excluded a
black juror in violation of the defendant's right under the New Jersey
Constitution to have a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. 9 The court rejected the state's contention that its challenge to the juror was justified because blacks are predominantly Baptists
and, as such, may be inclined to give more credit to the testimony of a
Baptist minister and Baptist practitioners, who were anticipated defense
witnesses.2 "0 Membership in the Baptist Church was deemed insufficient to justify peremptory exclusion of the juror.2 1 In its rejection of
the prosecutor's explanation, the court expressed its view that "peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors on the basis of presumed
'group bias' or mere 'group affiliation"' are "[b]eyond [their] scope and
therefore a perversion of [their] purpose."20 2 "That purpose ... is to
achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of the diverse
beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences." 203
Although the constitutional right at issue in Gilmore is the defendant's
right to be tried by a fair cross-section of the community, the court's
criticism of the prosecutor's reliance upon "assumptions about Blacks
and Baptists that are quite unflattering, not to say invidiously discriminatory, to both the racial group and the religious group," 2' demonstrates
a sensitivity to the rights of jurors who are subject to discriminatory
treatment.
In contrast, several courts, without directly addressing the issue of
Batson's application to jurors' First Amendment rights, have sanctioned
a litigant's use of religious affiliation or exercise to justify a peremptory
challenge. In United States v. Clemmons,05 the defendant objected to
the prosecutor's challenge of a black juror.20 6 In an effort to provide a

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986).
See id. at 1155.
See id. at 1168.
See id. at 1168-69.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1168.
892 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
Although there was some question as to whether the juror was in fact black, the court

assumed the juror was black for purposes of its decision. See id. at 1156.
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"race-neutral" explanation for the challenge, the prosecutor stated his
belief that the juror was of Asian-Indian decent and that "'Hindus
tend... to have feelings a good bit different from ours about all sorts
of things.' 2 0 7 The prosecutor, without providing either support for this
assumption or any rational relationship to the case at bar, expressed
concern that the potential juror "'may have religious beliefs that may
affect his thinking.' 20 8 The court concluded that the prosecutor's
decision to exclude the juror, "because of uncertainty about his religious
perspective,.. . did not violate [the juror's] right to equal protection.,,2' The holding in Clemmons pre-dates the Supreme Court's
expansion of the Batson Doctrine beyond the context of race, which may
account for the Third Circuit's reluctance to extend Batson to the context
of religion. 10
Another example of lower court reluctance to expand Batson to the
context of religion is People v. Malone."' The Appellate Court of
Illinois accepted, as part of a valid, race-neutral explanation to the
prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a black juror, the fact that "she read
the Bible every day.' 21 2 In support of its holding, the court noted that
the prosecution also peremptorily challenged a white woman who "was
near graduation from a theological seminary after which, she stated, she
would be assigned as a parish minister and that her primary activities
were editing the seminary's newspaper and reading ministry-related
materials."2 3 While challenges motivated by a potential juror's religious affiliations or practices may indeed be "race-neutral," they
nevertheless violate the juror's right to equal protection. While the
Malone court enforced the requirement that peremptory strikes be
justified on criteria apart from race, it failed to recognize that a raceneutral strike may nevertheless violate a constitutional right of the
potential juror. The Malone court's singular focus on race-neutrality

207. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief app. at 57).
208. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief app. at 57).

209. Id. at 1157.
210. J.E.B. v. Alabama exrel. T.B., which prohibited gender-based peremptory challenges, was
decided in 1994, five years after Clemmons. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
211. 570 N.E.2d 584 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 135 (111.1991).
212. Id. at 588.
213. Id. at 589-90. Although the trial court did excuse one juror for cause, on the basis that the
juror's religious beliefs precluded him from taking any action that would inhibit another person's
freedom, there is no indication in the court's decision that religious practice or affiliation was
otherwise relevant to juror fitness to serve on the case. Id. at 588. The case involved the robbery of
a bartender and owner of a bar in Chicago and did not appear to involve matters of religion. Id. at

586.
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betrayed an insensitivity to the stricken jurors' First Amendment rights.
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Greer,2" 4 considered the
appeal of several members of a white supremacist group convicted of
various civil rights violations in connection with the group's vandalism
of a synagogue and physical attacks on blacks and hispanics who
frequented a community park."1 5 The defendants argued that they were
denied the right to a fair and impartial jury in part because the trial court
refused to require Jewish jury panelists to so identify themselves." 6
The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that they were denied the
ability to use their peremptory challenges effectively in the absence of
information identifying Jewish prospective jurors.2 17 The court, citing
Supreme Court precedent, explained that it is not sufficient that a voir
dire question, if asked, would be helpful to the exercise of a peremptory
challenge.2"' To be constitutionally required, failure to pose the question
must render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.219
The court recognized that requiring people to identify themselves by
their religious affiliation as a precondition for jury service on a particular
case creates the danger of fostering religious persecution. The court
remarked: "[Having the judge determine which jurors are Jewish
requires questions disturbingly reminiscent of those asked by the very
people the [defendants] sought to celebrate in their planned re-creation
of Kristallnacht."22
While the court did not consider the First Amendment implications
of the defendant's voir dire requests, the court did note: "[E]ven if the
defendants had learned which prospective jurors were Jewish, they
constitutionally could not have based their peremptory challenges upon
this information, for the Supreme Court has sought to eliminate racial
and ethnic discrimination in the process of jury selection."2 1 In
upholding the trial judge's refusal to pose questions bearing upon
prospective jurors' religious affiliations, the Greer court demonstrated a
willingness to extend Batson to religion-based peremptory challenges.

214. 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993).
215. See id. at 1082-83.
216. Id. at 1084.
217. See id. at 1085.
218. See id. (citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991)). The court also rejected
defendant's contention that the trial court improperly denied their motion to remove all black,
hispanic, and Jewish panelists for cause. Id. at 1084.
219. Id. at 1085 (citing Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 425-26).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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G. Prohibitionon FirstAmendment-Based Peremptory Challenges:
The Litigants Right to a FairTrial Remains Intact
A prohibition against the exercise of a peremptory challenge that
conflicts with a juror's First Amendment rights will not in any way
hinder a litigant's right to a fair trial. Indeed, many have agreed that the
total elimination of the peremptory challenge from the American court
system would promote trial faimess. 222 Several scholars have advocated
the abolition of the peremptory challenge."' A complete bar would
certainly avoid infringement on potential jurors' constitutional rights. The
elimination of the peremptory challenge may also result in the formation
of more representative juries that include a greater diversity of juror
backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives. 224 Although the elimination
of the peremptory challenge merits serious consideration by policymakers charged with the responsibility of ensuring a fair, effective, and
participatory judicial system, the complete abolition of peremptory
challenges is not required to bring the jury selection process within
constitutional parameters. This Article suggests a less extreme position
which, if adopted, will result in substantial restrictions on the way in
which peremptories are presently exercised but would not entirely
prohibit their use.
The restrictions on peremptory challenges proposed by this Article
do not disturb the litigant's ability to pursue a challenge for cause that
impacts upon a juror's First Amendment rights. To the extent that a
potential juror's affiliations or expression of beliefs affect the juror's
ability to sit impartially on a particular case, inquiry about those
affiliations and beliefs is an appropriate prerequisite of a challenge to the
potential juror for cause. To insure that the voir dire inquiry does not
cross constitutional boundaries, the trial court must assess the relevance
of the proposed question to a challenge for cause. The nature and depth

222. Justice Marshal's concurrence in Batson advocates a complete elimination of the
peremptory challenge in criminal cases because of their "inherent potential ... to distort the jury

process." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986).
223. Critics calling for the elimination of peremptory challenges include: Broderick, supra note
104; Felice Banker, Note, Eliminatinga Safe Havenfor Discrimination:Why New York Must Ban
Peremptory Challengesfrom Jury Selection, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 605 (1995); and Horwitz, supra note
128.

224. See Banker, supra note 223, at 611 (arguing that peremptory challenges have led to
discrimination by attorneys against "potential jurors on the basis of race, gender and other invidious
grounds"); see also Broderick, supra note 104, at 422 (stating that the peremptory challenge system
has led to the regular exclusion of certain classes of citizens from jury service).
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of a voir dire probe to remove jurors for cause would be unaltered by the
constitutional constraints on peremptory challenges.
Several courts have considered proposed voir dire questions that
impact upon a potential juror's exercise of First Amendment rights.
Questions eliciting jurors' opinions or beliefs on controversial topics
must concern subjects that are "'inextricably bound up with the conduct
of the trial."'' '
Courts have permitted inquiry on jurors' political
6
views, racial prejudices, 2 7 and attitudes concerning topics such as
abortion,228 homosexuality, 29 and drug use,23 as areas which impact
upon the juror's fitness to serve on the particular trial. Courts have
allowed viewpoint questioning to the extent necessary to eliminate biased
jurors.23 1 For instance, in criminal cases where the prosecution has
requested the death penalty, litigants may probe a juror's views on capital
punishment which affect the juror's ability to impose a sentence of
death.232
A litigant's attempt to inquire beyond the purpose of removing
potential jurors for cause, however, creates a risk of infringing on the

First Amendment rights of potential jurors. Without directly considering
the First Amendment implications, many courts have restricted the nature

225. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976)), quoted in Cordero v. United States, 456 A.2d 837, 842
(D.C. 1983).
226. See Cordero, 456 A.2d at 842 (citing Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950) (per
curian), and United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 366-70 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973)).
227. See id. (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), and United States v. Bear
Runner, 502 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1974)).
228. See id. (citing People v. Murawski, 117 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Il1. 1954), Wasy v. State, 123
N.E.2d 462, 464 (Ind. 1955), and State v. Barnett, 445 P.2d 124, 125 (Or. 1968)).
229. See id. (citing State v. Murray, 375 So. 2d 80, 83 (La. 1979)).
230. See id. (citing State v. Conrad, 304 So. 2d 318, 319 (La. 1974)).
231. Cordero involved the criminal prosecution of a political activist arrested for disrupting
Congress. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the trial court improperly failed to
inform potential jurors of the controversial political issues involved in the trial and improperly failed
to explore whether the defendant's political beliefs and affiliations would effect the juror's ability
to render a just verdict. See 456 A.2d at 844-45.
Questions concerning potential jurors' attitudes toward people with orthodox lifestyles and
appearances were not pertinent to juror fitness. See id. at 845 n.17 (citing Ham, 409 U.S. at 527-28,
and United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see also United States v.
Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973); United States v.
Furey, 491 F. Supp. 1048, 1054-55 (E.D. Pa.), af'd,636 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451
U.S. 913 (1981); Commonwealth v. Jones, 399 N.E.2d 1081, 1095-97 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
232. For a discussion on jury selection in capital punishment cases, see Tracy A. Peterson, Note,
Morgan v. Illinois: An Attempt to Provide Equality in the Selection of Capital SentencingJurors,
38 VILL. L. REv. 1579 (1993).
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and depth of inquiry concerning jurors' opinions and beliefs. For
example, in United States v. Bray,233 a defendant, charged with the
bombing of an abortion clinic, submitted 101 proposed questions
concerning potential jurors' abortion-related beliefs, activities, and
personal experiences.2' The trial court posed several questions that
determined potential jurors' inability to sit impartially on the case.23
Nevertheless, the defendant appealed the trial court's failure to inquire
experiences of potential jurors and their
into the personal abortion-related
23 6
family members.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted its "unequivocal approval of the
district court's refusal to put the question," stating that "[p]otential jurors
have rights of privacy . ,,.237 The Bray court recognized that the
privacy interest of potential jurors rises above the right of a criminal
defendant to obtain greater information on which to exercise peremptory
challenges.23 8
Courts must also determine the relevance of proposed voir dire
questions concerning juror memberships and affiliations. In addition to
assessing whether the inquiry is appropriate, courts must determine
whether the potential juror's group membership affiliation warrants the
jurors' removal for cause.239 In United States v. Salamone,240 a prosecution for the illegal possession of firearms, the Third Circuit reviewed
the trial court's exclusion for cause of one potential juror and five

233. 805 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986) (table case, reported in full at 1986 WL 18037).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at *4-*5.
238. In addition to imposing limitations on questions that invade the personal experiences and
beliefs of potential jurors, courts have rejected proposed questions that are simply duplicative. See
McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 520 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979) (en banc), overruled on other
grounds by Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Cr. App. 1988).
239. In Cordero v. United States, the court noted that the defendant's proposed questions
concerning the prospective jurors' membership in "veterans' organizations, 'fraternal or other'
societies, lobbying groups, or anticommunist organizations ...were too sweeping; they were not
'reasonably calculated' to discover prejudice against appellant because of his political views or
associations." 456 A.2d 837, 845 n.17 (D.C. 1983); see also Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162,
171-72 (1950) (rejecting the argument that employees of the federal government are inherently
biased in a contempt action for failure to appear before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and should have, therefore, been excluded for cause on voir dire); Richardson v.
Communications Workers of An., 530 F.2d 126, 131 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 824 (1976)
(finding no abuse of discretion by trial court in refusing to summarily disqualify all union members
from the jury without some indication of bias in wrongfully discharged employee's action against

unions).
240. 800 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1986).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss3/1

44

Bader: Batson
Meets the First
Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challeng
PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES

1996]

potential alternate jurors based solely upon their membership in the
National Rifle Association ("NRA"). 241 Although the court specifically
did not consider the issue of the potential jurors' First Amendment rights,
which had been raised in an amicus brief filed by the NRA, the court did
note its disapproval of the government's assumption of juror prejudice
on the basis of group affiliation alone.24 Concluding that the potential
jurors' NRA affiliation did not warrant their exclusion for cause from
jury service, the court stated: "To allow trial judges and prosecutors to
determine juror eligibility based solely on their perceptions of the
external associations of a juror threatens the heretofore guarded right of
an accused to a fair trial by an impartial jury .... ""
The relevant inquiry in assessing the constitutionality of a probe that
implicates a potential juror's association and speech rights is whether the
potential juror's affiliations or expressions of beliefs constitute cause for
the juror's exclusion from service. Under the formulation proposed by
this Article, inquiry reasonably related to exclusion of a potential juror
for cause may include the potential juror's affiliations and expressions of
beliefs. Because restrictions on First Amendment-based peremptory
challenges do not affect a litigant's ability to challenge potential jurors
for cause, these restrictions will not impede the litigant's pursuit of a fair
trial by an impartial jury.
H.

Batson FirstAmendment Expansion FurthersIts
Underlying Rationale

Expanding the Batson Doctrine to prohibit peremptory challenges
that implicate a prospective juror's First Amendment rights is warranted
for several reasons. First, the Batson Doctrine, viewed at its most
rudimentary level, repudiates the harm engendered by discrimination
against prospective jurors on the basis of their race or gender, and
concludes that the harm inherent in such discrimination outweighs the
benefit gained by the litigant's unfettered exercise of peremptory
challenges. The Supreme Court has emphasized the significance of a
juror as an individual rather than a mere representative of a group: "'Jury
competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact

241.

Id. at 1217.

242. Id. at 1225. In expressing its criticism of the prosecution, the court remarked: "The
government conveniently ignores, however, the total absence on this record of any indication that
the excluded jurors individually possessed such views which would rightfully justify their dismissal.

Instead, the government relies on a theory of 'implied bias'...." Id.
243. Id.
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lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the
door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the
244
democratic ideals of trial by jury."'
The harm resulting from discrimination against prospective jurors
on the basis of their group associations and exercise of speech also
outweighs the litigant's benefit from using a peremptory challenge.245
This Article has already established that the peremptory challenge is not
constitutionally protected, not essential to a fair trial, and that its
implementation is subject to limitations.246 In order to complete the
analysis, it is necessary to evaluate the harm caused by discrimination
against prospective jurors based upon the exercise of their First
Amendment rights.
As with discrimination against a juror on the basis of race, gender,
or national origin, discrimination based upon the juror's exercise of her
First Amendment rights is a matter of constitutional significance.
Accordingly, balancing the interest of the litigant in the free exercise of
peremptory challenges against the potential juror's First Amendment
interests involves pitting a common law or statutory trial privilege against

a constitutionally guaranteed right. The constitutional dimension of the
discrimination makes the harm associated with the infringement more
significant than any loss to the litigant caused by monitoring his use of
peremptory strikes.24 7

244. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 n.19 (1994) (quoting Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)).
245. A prohibition on peremptory challenges motivated by a potential juror's group membership
also furthers the litigant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury that represents a fair cross section of the
community. The Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), reversed the
defendant's conviction because the prosecution's peremptory exclusion violated the defendant's
constitutional right to a jury compromised of a representative cross section of the community. See
id. at 526-33. The underlying goal of the fair cross section standard is to bring to the deliberation
process a gamut of diverse personal experiences, beliefs, and perspectives. Therefore, restricted use
of peremptory challenges will contribute to a more representative jury composition. See Note,
Limiting the PeremptoryChallenge: Representation of Groups on PetitJuries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715,
1733 (1977).
246. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. It is also worthy to note that First
Amendment limitations on peremptory challenges would restrict all parties to the litigation equally.
The prohibition against striking a juror in a manner that implicates the juror's First Amendment right
does not, by its nature, tend to favor, for example, plaintiffs over defendants or defendants over
prosecutors. Thus, this expansion of Batson does not disturb the equilibrium of the playing field.
247. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-30. The harm to jurors from discriminatory challenges
extends beyond the mere instance of their removal from service. As the Court states: "Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system." Id.
at 1430. The Court continues: "It not only furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the
promise of equality under the law-that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the
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Abhorrence of discrimination based upon invidious stereotypes in
the selection of jurors is at the core of the Batson Doctrine.24 The
Supreme Court has expressed its concern over the stigmatizing effect of
stereotyping individuals.24 9 The Court in J.E.B. stated:
The Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this Court,
acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in some stereotypes, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before
making judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as
to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination. 2 °
The discrimination in a "pure Batson" situation involves utilizing
racial, ethnic, and gender stereotyping-violative of a prospective juror's
equal protection rights-in order to make assumptions as to a prospective
juror's inclination toward a particular disposition of the case. In the First
Amendment context, the discrimination involves stereotyping jurors and
inferring their likely disposition of the case based upon the stereotypes
derived from a juror's speech and associations, in violation of the juror's
equal protection and First Amendment rights. While the stigma associated
with a litigant's rejection of a juror based upon a stereotype inferred
from either the juror's affiliations or expressions may be less severe to
the potential juror than the stigma associated with rejection prompted by

chance to take part directly in our democracy." Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407
(1991)). Enabling citizens to take part in our democracy is the very goal the First Amendment was
designed to foster.
248. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Opponents of the Batson Doctrine argue
that a juror's race and gender are factors that affect perceptions and inclinations in the adjudication
of a case. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (opposing the
extension of Batson to gender based strikes); Batson, 476 U.S. at 121-39 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, the Court forbade litigants from using such factors in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. Id. at 89.
249. In J.E.B., the Court reaffirmed its abhorrence of employing stereotypes as a basis for
peremptory challenges, even if some degree of support for validity of the stereotype exists, stating:
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used
to justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection. We have made abundantly clear in past
cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal
Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the
generalization.
.. E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 n. 11. In its rationale, the Court emphasized the exclusion of segments of
society and the resulting stigmatization that occurs when stereotypes are used as the basis of action.
Even if a litigant can show some statistical justification for excluding a juror based on group
affiliations or expressions of that juror, the court should nevertheless prevent the litigant from using
peremptory challenges to strike the juror in order to avoid any stigmatizing effect on the rejected
at 1427.
juror. See id.
250. Id. at 1427 n.11.
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stereotyping based on immutable qualities such as race, ethnicity, or
gender, the distinction lies merely in the degree of stigma produced in
the "pure Batson" context as compared to the First Amendment context.
All forms of court-sanctioned stereotyping have the potential to
stigmatize the victim of discriminatory treatment. Because individuals are
influenced by social comparison and the views that others hold of them,
a stereotyped individual has a tendency to view herself through a more
myopic lens and, therefore, to conform to the stereotype.2 5 '
While a citizen may experience his own participation in jury service
more in terms of the personal inconvenience to his own life than for the
opportunity to influence the adjudication process, the citizen may
simultaneously attach great value to this nation's jury system as an
institution and recognize the collective responsibility it requires.252
Accordingly, the importance of non-discriminatory access to jury service
transcends the desire of an individual prospective juror to participate in
the judicial system.2 53 To ensure the inclusive nature of the jury
selection process, courts must protect the individual rights of citizens not
to be excluded from equal participation in jury service.
Furthermore, persistent stereotyping based upon speech or association poses the danger of polarizing segments of society based upon group
associations or the contradictory view to which each segment subscribes.
When we stereotype individuals based upon specific instances of conduct,
we form a framework containing a multitude of assumptions. The
categorization of people according to these assumptions restricts the
range of perceptions the "stereotyper" can form about the individual she
stereotypes. To the extent that the trial court approves the exclusion of
jurors on the basis of labels created by the litigant, the potential juror is
told, in effect, that she does not qualify for a type of government service
due to the litigant's categorization and the accompanying assumptions
which the court has accepted.
Additionally, extending Batson to the First Amendment context
enables more citizens to participate in the justice system. While there

251. See Gerald F. Corey, Self-FulfillingProphecies,in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 370,
370 (Raymond J. Corsini ed., 2d ed. 1994); John H. Fleming & Debra J. Manning, Self-Fulfilling
Prophecies, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 89, 90 (V.S. Ramachandran ed., 1994).

252. "Every American citizen can vote or be voted for and may be a juror." DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 2, at 25 1.
253. "The jury is both the most effective way of establishing the people's rule and the most
efficient way of teaching them how to rule.' Id. at 254.
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may be empirical or anecdotal evidence- that the majority of citizens
view jury service as an undesirable burden,255 there exists competing
evidence, also both empirical2 56 and anecdotal, 57 that many citizens
want to be selected to adjudicate a case and may, in fact, tailor their
responses to voir dire questions in an effort to please litigants, thereby
increasing their chances to be selected to hear the case. Prospective jurors
may even provide inaccurate answers in the hope that by doing so they
will not be excused. 58 Even if a substantial percent of citizens view
jury service as a burden to be avoided rather than a valued privilege, the
fact remains that exclusion from service may constitute an infringement

of the juror's constitutional rights and contravene the policies underlying
Batson.

There is no merit to the argument that exclusion from jury service,
or from any form of participation in government, is acceptable simply
because the citizen finds the service burdensome or bothersome. Jury
service, similar to other forms of government participation, is a right,25

as well as an obligation.2" The protection against constitutional
infringement in the exercise of the privileges of citizenship is not
diminished by a citizen's lack of appreciation for those privileges.26'
The unfortunate reality may indeed be that the majority of citizens do not

254. See Andrea Gerlin, Jury-Duty Scofflaws Try Patience of Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
1995, at B1, BI ("In Los Angeles County, the percentage of jurors not responding to jury-duty
notices rose to about 48% last year from 36% two years earlier.").
255. The disaffection with jury service is likely attributable, in large part, to the disruption it
brings to the juror's daily routine. To the extent that a juror is excluded from a particular case, she
is, nevertheless, required to continue to report to the courthouse and be available to serve on other
cases. Thus, a prospective juror may prefer to be selected to try the case over exclusion. See Edward
Rafeedie, The Conduct of Trials, a Neglected Area ofJudicialReform, 23 Sw. U. L. REV. 205, 208
(1994) (explaining that "[w]hat jurors dread most about jury service is the prospect of sitting around
waiting").
256. Dwan V. Kerig, Perceptionsfrom a JuryBox, 54 STATE BAR J. 306, 307 n.5 (1979) (citing
Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 526

(1965)).
257. Id. Citizens concerned about their right to serve as jurors have formed the organization,
We the Jury, devoted to the protection and promotion of the right. We the Jury publishes a monthly
newspaper which includes articles advising citizens how they can minimize the risk of being
challenged from jury service by attorneys.
258. Id.
259. See J.E.B. v. Alabama cc rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 (1994).
260. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
261. For instance, many citizens view the right to vote, not as a precious right to be treasured,
but as a burdensome obligation that they prefer not to exercise. The right to vote is nevertheless
afforded constitutional protection. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-56 (1964) (citing to the line

of cases establishing the right to vote as constitutional).
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hold in proper regard the privilege of participation in our system of
justice."f Even if this is an accurate assessment, it does not diminish
the constitutional protection afforded the right to such participation.
Furthermore, even if it frees the individual from an unwanted
obligation, rejection may nevertheless be psychologically stigmatizing.
A juror excluded from sitting on a particular case on the basis of race,
gender, or ethnicity may simultaneously feel relieved of an obligation
and harmed by the invidious discrimination. Similarly, a juror struck
from service as a consequence of exercising her First Amendment rights
may feel simultaneously relieved of an obligation and offended by the
preclusion. Institutionalized invidious discrimination offends the nation's
citizenry and undermines the credibility of the nation's jury system. 6
Moreover, the argument that exclusion from jury service may be
viewed as a blessing rather than a curse has equal application to a "pure
Batson" situation.2 4 One can argue that a prospective juror excluded
from jury service on the basis of race or gender, may ultimately be
pleased by the exclusion. The relief felt by a dismissed juror would not,
of course, justify the discriminatory challenge. The exclusion is a
violation of the juror's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection
2 61
jury.
that
on
serve
to
desire
her
of
regardless
laws
the
of
A prohibition on the exercise of peremptory challenges arising from
the prospective juror's speech and association practices reduces the
potential for stigmatizing jurors and chilling the exercise of such rights,
and thereby minimizes the risk of undermining the value we attach to the
First Amendment freedoms. Opponents of Batson's expansion into the
realm of the First Amendment may contend that any chilling effect on

262. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
263. As indicated above, while this Article does not seek to equate the magnitude of the stigma
associated with rejection from jury service on the basis of one's exercise of First Amendment rights

to speech or association with the magnitude of the stigma associated with exclusion from jury service
on the basis of immutable qualities such as race, ethnicity, or gender, the distinction between the
stigmas is merely one of degree.
264. The argument could also be made with regard to the categorical exclusion of persons from
the panel of eligible jurors on the basis of their race, gender, or ethnicity.
265. Just as a litigant may object to a peremptory strike which is improperly based upon the
juror's race or gender via third-party standing, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991), a
litigant may similarly oppose a peremptory strike that violates a juror's First Amendment right. An
expressly stated wish of a juror to pursue the protection of that right is not a prerequisite for a grant

of third-party standing. Affording the litigant standing to assert the First Amendment right of a
potential juror is consistent with Batson and the doctrine of third-party standing generally.
Accordingly, proof that the excused juror approves the litigant's pursuit of the juror's First
Amendment right is unnecessary.
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a juror's exercise of her speech or association rights produced by
exclusion from jury service is likely to be minimal at best. It may be
accurate to assume that denial of the right to serve on a jury will not
deter, to any great extent, a potential juror from associating or speaking
freely. Nevertheless, any measure of inhibition by a potential juror to
exercise her First Amendment rights is significant.
In addition to comporting with the language and logic of the Batson
Doctrine, requiring peremptory challenges to be speech and association
neutral recognizes the importance of a citizen's First Amendment rights.
Those who would bemoan the demise of the peremptory challenge by an
expansion of Batson into the realm of the First Amendment fail to
appreciate the high cost of government-sanctioned discrimination against
individuals in the exercise of their constitutional rights. It is from this
perspective-recognizing the constitutional significance of speech and
association rights--that the limitations on peremptory challenges must be
viewed.
While a lengthy dissertation expounding upon the precious nature
of the First Amendment rights to speak and to associate freely is beyond
the scope of this Article,2" it is important to state that the litigant's
interest in unfettered peremptory challenges is pitted against a constitutional value that has often been credited as the most central ingredient of
this country's social and political freedom.267 Legal and political
scholars, as well as philosophers and poets, have extolled the virtues of
the First Amendment's protection since it was first penned. 268 To

266. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1640 (1987) (stating that free speech, democracy, and self-

realization are all connected in "a web of mutually reinforcing values"); Stanley Ingber,
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional
Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1, 43 (1990) (noting that some may argue that free speech "cultivate[s]
individual habits of the mind ....nurture[s] intellectual values, and] promote[s] the democratic
personality").
267. See JOHN STUART MILL, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in 18 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON POLmCS AND SOcIETY 228, 229 (J.M. Robson ed.,
1977); Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J.
689, 720 (1994) ("[T]he First Amendment is an important cultural force and political force of its
own .... .).
268. William Douglas eloquently expressed his appreciation of the First Amendment:
In the oscillating movement of the planets man is a tiny speck-a microcosm. We
seek truth, and in that search, a medley of voices is essential. That is why the First
Amendment is our most precious inheritance. It gives equal time to my opponents, as it
gives to me.

I hope it is always that way in this great land, which, in spite of its shortcomings,
is still the hope of mankind across the globe.
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permit the peremptory challenge, which is neither constitutionally
protected nor necessary for a fair trial, to take precedence over First
Amendment guarantees, emasculates and degrades this precious
constitutional right and undermines the principles and policies that it
promotes.
The First Amendment nurtures our citizenry with the free flow of
ideas and the ability to form, maintain, and share convictions. A political
structure that provides its members an opportunity to associate and
express thoughts freely breeds a more dynamic, creative, and satisfied
society. Restraints on this freedom inhibit the individual's, as well as
society's, potential for growth.
Our First Amendment guarantees, so tightly woven into our political
fabric, are not without costs. Protecting the sanctity of ideas and our
ability to engage in their exchange includes, by its very nature, protection
of unpopular ideas.2 69 There are instances in which the pursuit of a
conflicting interest or freedom may legally succumb to the protection of
a First Amendment interest. It is the clash of opposing interests that tests
our commitment to the First Amendment values.
I

The PracticalImplications of Batson Expansion

Under this Article's proposed expansion of Batson, a First
Amendment-based objection to a peremptory challenge would be raised
and resolved in much the same manner as traditional Batson challenges.
The opponent of the challenge must establish a prima facie case that the
strike was motivated by either the potential juror's group associations or
expressions27 ° that are unrelated to cause. A court evaluating whether
the litigant has met the evidentiary threshold will consider all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the challenge, including: the nature of the
juror's First Amendment exercise; common stereotypes associated with
such exercise; characteristics of other potential jurors who were excluded
from the panel by the litigant; and characteristics of other potential jurors

WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 470 (1974); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) ("[The First Amendment] does
not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public debate.... What is
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.").
269. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417 (1989) (holding that desecration of the
American flag is afforded First Amendment protection).
270. A litigant could also establish a prima facie case of First Amendment discrimination to a
peremptory challenge based upon the juror's religious affiliation or practices. Religion-based
peremptory challenges are not, however, the focus of this Article.
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whom the litigant opted to retain on the jury panel.
If the opponent of a challenge establishes a prima facie case of First
Amendment discrimination, the burden shifts to the proponent to set forth
a "First Amendment-neutral" basis for the challenge. If the proponent
justifies the challenge on grounds unrelated to the juror's First Amendment-protected activities, a court should uphold the challenge. If
however, the challenger is unable to provide a satisfactory, non-pretextual
explanation that does not implicate the juror's constitutional rights, the
challenge should be disallowed under the Batson Doctrine.
A court's evaluation of the merits in a "pure" Batson challenge is
fact-sensitive. The court must determine the motivation underlying an
individual litigant's actions and the candor of the explanation the litigant
offers. The same fact-sensitive inquiry applies to a First Amendment
Batson challenge.
A comparison of characteristics shared by those jurors who have
been previously struck and jurors whom the litigant has sought to retain
can inform the court as to the sincerity of the litigant's explanation and
whether the court is assessing the explanation for its race, gender, or
First Amendment neutrality. If, for example, in connection with the
challenge of a black juror, the proponent of the challenge attributes the
strike to the juror's status as a business owner, the litigant's failure to
challenge a white business owner would be instructive in evaluating the
role of the juror's race in the litigant's decision to challenge. Similarly,
if the same juror had indicated membership in M.A.D.D. and the litigant
maintained that the impetus for the strike was the juror's status as a
business owner, rather than her group affiliation, the litigant's failure to
challenge business owners who are not affiliated with M.A.D.D. would
undermine the credibility of the neutral explanation.
While a trial court would employ the same principles to determine
a "pure" Batson challenge and a First Amendment-based Batson
challenge, evaluating the constitutionality of a particular peremptory
challenge may be more difficult in the context of the First Amendment
than in the racial, gender or ethnicity contexts. Immutable characteristics
of potential jurors are generally readily apparent. 271 A court can, for
example, calculate the number of black or female jurors a particular
litigant has excluded to reach the conclusion that either race or gender is

271.

But see United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1156 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496

U.S. 927 (1990) (explaining that the race of a potential juror was not apparent to the litigant). In our
multi-cultural "melting pot," racial ambiguity is not uncommon.
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a predominant factor in the litigant's pattern of exercising challenges. On
the other hand, it may be difficult for a court to draw an inference from
parallels between multiple challenges that implicate the First Amendment
rights of jurors.
Close scrutiny of a litigant's pattern of exercising peremptory
challenges may, however, reveal First Amendment-related motivation. In
the example of the juror affiliated with M.A.D.D., if the litigant who
exercised the challenge did not challenge another otherwise similarly
posed potential juror who engaged in a different First Amendment
activity, such as membership in the Boy Scouts of America, the court
could determine that the juror was struck because of her M.A.D.D.
membership.
An additional complication in applying Batson to First Amendmentbased peremptory challenges arises because the evaluation of a potential
juror's race is factual, whereas an evaluation of a potential juror's First
Amendment exercise may require legal determinations. For example, it
may become necessary for the trial court to determine whether a juror
who is wearing a tee shirt sporting the slogan "No Nukes" is engaged in
speech-related conduct.272 Accordingly, a trial court may be required to
apply the legal principles attendant to the First Amendment in order to
assess the constitutional propriety of a particular peremptory challenge.
The fact that compliance with a constitutional mandate requires the court
to engage in complex and possibly time-consuming legal thought is not
an acceptable argument for abandoning a constitutional mandate.
Although an added layer of legal analysis imposes an additional burden
upon the trial court, the imposition is necessary to ensure that peremptory
challenges are exercised within constitutional parameters.
The restrictions that this Article suggests would in no way impact
the litigant's ability to exercise a challenge for cause that implicated the
challenged juror's First Amendment rights. A litigant who can establish
that a juror's affiliation with a particular association prevents the juror
from rendering a fair and impartial verdict, can eliminate the juror for
cause. In the latter circumstance, the juror's First Amendment right may
be compromised in order to ensure the litigant's constitutional right to a
fair trial. Accordingly, questions concerning a juror's expression, group
associations, or religious affiliation are appropriate to the extent that

272. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (holding that a defendant wearing a jacket
bearing offensive language was exercising his First Amendment right of speech).
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eliciting such information is necessary for the litigant to challenge the
juror for cause. 3
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1985, Batson v. Kentucky provided the basis for a new doctrine
prohibiting peremptory challenges motivated by invidious discrimination
against a prospective juror. In its current application, the Batson Doctrine
protects a prospective juror's equal protection right against racial, ethnic,
and gender discrimination. Expanding the Batson Doctrine to provide
equal protection to a prospective juror's rights to associate and speak
freely is warranted under the broad language, doctrinal framework, and
rationale of Batson. The peremptory challenge is a mere privilege and not
a constitutionally protected right. Courts must prevent a litigant from
abusing the privilege by discriminating against a prospective juror on the
basis of the juror's affiliations or expressions of speech. The First
Amendment should not bend to accommodate the peremptory challenge.
The Constitution is the foremost body of law governing our nation. It is
offensive to the Constitution to allow litigants to discriminate against
potential jurors based upon their associations and speech. Until courts
prohibit association and speech-based peremptory challenges, the First
Amendment will be impermissibly subordinated to the peremptory
challenge privilege. While litigants may desire control in constructing the
entity that renders judgement on the case, accommodating litigants at the
expense of the First Amendment carries too steep a price.

273. See United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1986). In Salamone, an unlawful
firearm possession prosecution, jurors were improperly excluded for cause based solely upon NRA
membership. See id. at 1229. Although the court specifically declined to address the First

Amendment issue raised in an amicus brief filed by the NRA, the court noted the offensive nature
of bias based upon stereotypical assumptions related to a juror's affiliations. See id. at 1224-27.
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